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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study is to show how target employee stock options (ESOs) are 
valued in mergers and acquisitions, and to answer whether the possibility of company 
being bought should affect the stock option values. I also investigate whether the 
valuation methods used in transactions retain the total value of ESOs including both the 
intrinsic and the time value components, what factors determine the choice of valuation 
method, and what are the implications of different methods to the option valuation. 
DATA 
Data set consists of option valuation method observations in mergers and acquisitions in 
2008 and 2009, in which the target is publicly listed on either NYSE or Nasdaq. Total 
number of transactions in the sample is 381, and the number of option valuation method 
observations is 316 after excluding observations with no information available. 
RESULTS 
Findings of the study show that two main valuation methods emerge. Usually, target 
option holders receive the intrinsic value of options (the offer value over the exercise 
price) and the options are forfeited, or then the options are converted to new options of 
the acquirer or the surviving corporation. Options are more likely to be converted if 
transaction is paid in stock, when the transaction value is high, and when the acquirer is 
publicly listed or based in the US. 
Converting options retains the time value of options and therefore generally retains or 
increases the option value. Paying the intrinsic value and forfeiting options may result to 
either  lower  or  higher  option  value,  and  the  outcome  is  mainly  driven  by  the  takeover  
premium and option moneyness. For instance, in 21% of the cases when the intrinsic 
value is paid, the strike price of all options exceeds the offer value and the payoff to the 
option holders equals to zero. Findings suggest that ESO valuation in corporate 
transactions  can  have  a  significant  effect  on  option  value  and  therefore  it  should  be  in  
incorporated into the valuation models. 
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HENKILÖSTÖOPTIOIDEN ARVONMÄÄRITYS YRITYSKAUPOISSA:  
TARINA MENETETYISTÄ AIKA-ARVOISTA 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on osoittaa miten henkilöstöoptiot arvostetaan yrityskaupoissa 
sekä tulisiko tämän vaikuttaa optioiden arvoon. Tutkimus pyrkii myös osoittamaan 
säilyttävtäkö eri arvostustavat optioiden arvon kokonaisuudessaan sisältäen sekä option 
perus- että aika-arvon, mitkä asiat vaikuttavat arvostustavan valintaan, ja mitkä ovat eri 
arvostustapojen vaikutukset henkilöstöoptioiden arvonmääritykseen. 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Aineisto koostuu optioiden arvostustavoista yrityskaupoissa vuosina 2008 ja 2009, joissa 
kohdeyhtiön pörssi on joko NYSE tai Nasdaq. Otokseen sisältyvien yrityskauppojen 
määrä on 381. Lopullinen otos sisältää 316 havaintoa, joissa tieto optioiden 
arvostustavasta on saatavilla. 
TULOKSET 
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että yrityskaupan yhteydessä kohdeyhtiön optionhaltijat 
saavat joko option perusarvon (option toteutushinnan ylittävä osa tarjouksen arvosta) ja 
optiot keskeytetään tai optiot muunnetaan uusiksi ostavan yrityksen optioiksi. Optioiden 
muuntaminen on todennäköisempää, jos vastike koostuu ostajan omista osakkeista, 
yrityskaupan arvo on korkea, ja jos ostaja on julkisesti noteerattu tai Yhdysvaltalainen 
yhtiö. 
Optioiden muuntaminen säilyttää option aika-arvon ja tästä syystä pääsääntöisesti 
säilyttää tai kasvattaa option arvoa. Perusarvon maksaminen ja option keskeyttäminen 
voi joko laskea tai kasvattaa option arvoa, riippuen lähinnä kohteen osakkeen arvon 
ylittävän tarjoushinnan suuruudesta sekä tarjoushinnan ja option toteutushinnan välisestä 
suhteesta. Esimerkiksi 21 prosentissa tapauksista optionhalijat eivät saaneet mitään 
korvausta optioiden keskeyttämisestä, sillä toteutushinta ylitti tarjouksen arvon ja lisäksi 
optioista maksettiin vain sen perusarvo. Tutkimustulokset osoittavat että 
henkilöstöoptioiden arvostus yrityskaupoissa voi merkittävästi vaikuttaa option arvoon, 
jonka takia tämä tulisi ottaa huomioon arvonmääritysmalleissa. 
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1 
1. Introduction 
In a cash acquisition of AT&T Wireless by Cingular, employee stock options (ESO) were 
terminated and holders were paid the difference between the offer value and the strike price of 
options.  If  options  were  out-of-the-money,  that  is  when  the  strike  price  exceeds  the  offer  
value, options were to be terminated with no compensation what so ever. As a result, former 
officers of MediaOne, a company that AT&T earlier acquired in stock for stock transaction, 
decided to seek compensation for the cashed out options. The plaintiffs claimed that AT&T 
Wireless violated the terms of the option plan under which the options had been granted, 
when it cashed out the options without any compensation for the lost time value of the 
options.1 Reason for the dispute was a paragraph in the option plan that required appropriate 
adjustments to preserve each plan participant's economic position with respect to the options. 
Earlier in the stock for stock merger of MediaOne, AT&T converted the options to the options 
of AT&T and hence retained the ‘economic position’ of options.  
In its ruling, the Court of Delaware concluded that ‘economic position’ means the full 
economic value of the options including the intrinsic value and the time value of options. 
Consequently, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to an additional $11 million in 
damages, calculated using the Black & Scholes option valuation formula.2 In its opinion, the 
Court also noted that as a general rule, the value of a stock option is tied to that of the 
underlying security, and therefore if the underlying security is converted into the right to 
receive a fixed sum of cash, the value of the option will also be measured by reference to that 
same amount of cash. This implies that in general, out-of-the-money stock options can be 
cancelled for no consideration in a transaction without the consent of option holder, unless the 
option plan specifically states otherwise. 
ESOs have number of features that prevent their valuation using standard option valuation 
models such as the model of Black and Scholes (1973) (B-S model) or the binomial model of 
                                               
1 Court opinions discussed include Lillis v. A T & T Corp., 2007 WL 2110587 (Del. Ch., July 20, 2007) and AT & 
T Corp. v. Lillis, (Del. Supr., May 22, 2008). 
2 The decision by the Chancery Court was later on first reversed by the Supreme Court, and then subsequently 
reaffirmed. See opinion AT & T  Corp. v. Lillis, (Del. Supr., March 9, 2009) for further details. 
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Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979). These features include, for instance, a vesting period during 
which they cannot be exercised, selling and hedging restrictions, and generally a significantly 
longer maturity compared to the traded options (see for instance Rubinstein, 1994; Hull and 
White, 2004). Due to the selling and hedging restrictions, ESO holders need to exercise the 
options and sell the shares in order to realize a cash benefit or diversify their portfolios, 
resulting to options being exercised well before maturity (see for instance Huddart and Lang, 
1996; Carpenter and Yermack, 1998; Bettis et al., 2005). Despite the exhaustive number of 
studies on ESO valuation that try to take the distinctive features of ESOs into account, the 
valuation in company transactions has so far received little attention. It is clear that in a stock 
for stock merger for instance, something will happen to options of the target company as the 
underlying security no longer exists following the transaction. Hence the question is what 
option holders receive in lieu for their options and how is the value of those options 
determined. 
Despite the lack of studies on the topic, several authors discuss the threat of takeover and its 
effect on option value. Considering traded options, Black (1989) states the B-S model to be 
used in situations where in reality there should be a large difference between the market prices 
and prices provided by the model, such as when a cash takeover is likely to end the life of the 
option or warrant. Similarly, Jennergren and Näslund (1996) consider traded options whose 
lives are stochastic because option contracts can be prematurely cancelled when company is 
being bought.  
Yet few papers mention the possibility of company being bought and consequently the effect 
on ESO value as the vesting conditions are relaxed. Maller et al. (2002) assume ESOs to vest 
following a takeover bid despite the vesting or performance criteria of the options. Although 
not included in their valuation model, authors suggest modeling the probability of a takeover 
by a similar approach to the one used to model employee departure. Furthermore, authors note 
that forgoing valuable vesting conditions in the event of a takeover is not costless to the 
shareholders when they remain shareholders of the combined entity. Szimayer (2004) takes 
the issue a step further and presents a reduced form model that incorporates both the 
possibility of employee departure and takeover, since according to the author both events 
terminate the ESO contract. Author argues that the main difference between the takeover and 
employee departure is that a takeover prior the vesting of ESOs assigns option a certain fixed 
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value, whereas early departure forfeits the option. In addition to assuming a fixed cash 
payment for the unvested ESOs, author models the takeover after vesting to result in options 
being exercised and option holders receiving an additional fixed cash payment. As a side note, 
Szimayer (2004) also states that in general a takeover increases the value of an ESO, although 
no explicit reasoning is provided. A book by Ferenczy (2008) discusses the changes in the 
vesting status of options when a takeover takes place and notes that in acquisitions option 
holders are usually given a possibility to exercise the options before the forfeiture. However, 
the book states that in mergers it is common to convert options into equivalent options in the 
surviving company based on the exchange ratio. 
Also empirical evidence suggests corporate transactions to be of importance when considering 
the valuation of ESOs. Ikäheimo et al. (2006) use data of listed ESOs in Finland to compare 
market values and theoretical B-S model values. Surprisingly they find markets to value ESOs 
significantly below the value predicted by B-S model even though listed ESOs can be owned 
by investors who are not constrained by the same restrictions than the employees. In addition, 
ESOs are not anymore forfeited if employee leaves the company and therefore one would 
assume market prices to equal to B-S prices. Deviations of as much as 50% are reported and 
average difference is almost 15%. They find the time to expiration to have a major influence 
on the undervaluation and suggest the possibility of change in the corporate structure to lower 
the cost of ESOs to shareholders. ESOs are assumed to expire in case of merger resulting to 
the loss of time value of options. Urtti (2009) studies ESOs in corporate transactions in 
Finland and concludes that the hypothesis by Ikäheimo et al. (2006) of lost time value could 
be studied further. Author finds that in majority of cases option holders effectively receive the 
intrinsic value of options and in some cases a small fixed amount of cash is paid if options are 
out-of-the-money. Other valuation methods include determining the payoff using the B-S 
value or quoted market price of options. 
The purpose of this study is to show how ESOs are valued in company transactions to answer 
whether it should affect the stock option values. Scarce literature on the topic mainly 
considers  the  changes  in  vesting  status  of  the  options,  although  the  Court  of  Delaware  and  
Ferenczy (2008) suggest alternative ESO valuation methods to exist in corporate transactions. 
Discussed methods include paying the intrinsic value of options and converting the options 
into equivalent options in the surviving corporation, and in addition Urtti (2009) shows that at 
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least in Finland other valuation methods exist. According to my knowledge, there exist no 
previous studies that would investigate ESOs in transactions in the US beyond the theoretical 
discussion. Also, the emphasis of the discussions seems to be in changes in the vesting status, 
not the possibility of ESOs being valued in a completely different ways from transaction to 
another.  
The research question in this study is “How are ESOs valued in mergers and acquisitions in 
the US?” I also aim to answer whether the valuation methods retain the total value of ESOs 
including both the intrinsic and time value, what factors determine the valuation method used, 
and what are the implications of different methods to the option valuation. 
I collect the information of option valuation method in 381 transactions during 2008 and 2009 
in which target is listed on either NYSE or Nasdaq. Based on the 316 option valuation method 
observations, I show that two main categories emerge. First, in 67% of the cases option 
holders are paid only the intrinsic value of options (the difference between the offer value and 
the exercise price) causing them to lose the time value of options. On average, offering only 
the intrinsic value of options sacrifices 5.7 years of remaining option life, highlighting the fact 
of ESOs being long maturity options and the time value constituting a significant component 
of the option value. The most common method in this category is to offer the intrinsic value 
for all options despite their vesting status. Second, in 30% of the cases options are converted 
to new options of the acquirer or the surviving corporation, and therefore the time value of 
options is retained. The most common method in this category is to convert all outstanding 
options of the target. Other interesting individual methods also exists, such as paying 50% of 
the B-S value for the out-of-the-money options and offering restricted stock units in lieu of 
terminating the out-of-the-money options. 
I am able to find strong support for certain target, acquirer, and transaction characteristics 
affecting whether the intrinsic value is paid and time value lost or whether the options are 
converted and the time value retained. Based on the univariate evidence and estimated logistic 
regression models, I find the method of payment to have large impact on the ESO valuation 
method. Options are significantly more likely to retain time value if the acquirer uses stock in 
a transaction and consequently the use of cash is negatively related to retaining time value as 
options tend to be paid intrinsic value in cash deals. In addition, options are more likely to be 
converted and hence retain the time value when transaction becomes larger in terms of the 
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transaction value. Also publicly listed and US acquirers are more likely to convert options and 
therefore not sacrifice the time value of options. 
I also illustrate that at most of a time, converting options in transaction yields a value above 
the one produced by ordinary option valuation model prior the transaction, unless the 
volatility of the new underlying stock is significantly below the volatility of the target 
company. Instead, using the intrinsic value method can result to either lower or higher option 
value compared to pre-transaction option value even though the time value of options is lost. 
The outcome is mainly affected by how large a premium is paid and the moneyness of the 
option. The fraction of out-of-the-money options after taking the premium into account is 
21% of the observations in which the intrinsic value is paid, in which it is clear that the time 
value is lost since the payoff to the option holders is equal to zero. Finally, due to the cost of 
issuing new incentive instruments, I anticipate the acquirer to prefer converting options if it 
seeks to retain the employees holding the options. Option holders instead are likely to prefer 
receiving the intrinsic value although the time value is lost, since they are likely to receive 
new incentive instruments if they retain their positions. 
My findings contribute to the existing literature by highlighting the importance of the 
possibility of company being bought to the valuation of ESOs, and the investigation of the 
valuation method determinants lays out the foundation for the development of pricing models 
that predict how options are valued in these situations. Incorporating the findings of the study 
to the pricing models would produce more accurate estimates of ESO expenses to the 
companies, as well as more precise estimates of ESO values to the option holders. This may, 
however, require companies to adopt some more flexible valuation model than B-S. 
Rest of the study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical foundation of the 
study by discussing the previous literature with focus on the ESO valuation. Chapter 3 
presents the research design and data of the empirical part of the study. Chapter 4 shows the 
identified ESO valuation methods and depicts the overall use of alternative methods. Chapter 
5 considers the determinants of valuation methods by first defining the investigated 
explanatory variables and showing the univariate evidence, followed by the multivariate 
analysis conducted by estimating logistic regression models using various model 
specifications. Chapter 6 discusses the results from the previous chapters and implications to 
option valuation. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical background 
This chapter reviews the theoretical background underlying the study. First section briefly 
reviews the distinctive characteristics of ESOs compared to the traded options and discusses 
the valuation of ESOs. Second section talks about the scarce literature of ESO valuation in 
corporate transactions. I review the previous evidence on how might companies value stock 
options in the transactions, what might determine the valuation method used, and how the 
ESO valuation in mergers and acquisitions could be taken into account in the valuation 
models. Last section focuses on the topical subject of accounting treatment and valuation of 
ESOs. 
2.1 Valuation and characteristics of ESOs 
This section takes a brief look at the overwhelming literature on ESO valuation. First, I 
briefly discuss ESOs in general and present how the value of ESOs can be different to the 
different parties such as the option holders and the companies who grant the options. Second, 
the main issues in valuing ESOs using ordinary option pricing models are explained. Finally, 
alternative approaches and models to value ESOs are presented and discussed. 
ESOs are contracts between the employee and the employer that give the holder the right to 
buy a share of stock at the pre-specified exercise price. Because of the separation of the 
ownership and the management of firms, stock options are granted to the employees to align 
the interests of the parties, such as the increased risk taking of the executives (see for instance 
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Among others, Murphy (1999) 
shows that the stock options are widely used and that the fraction of options out of the total 
compensation is significant. For instance, the author shows that the share of options exceeds 
30% out of the total value of compensation for the CEOs in S&P500 firms. 
When  considering  ESOs  it  is  important  to  make  the  distinction  between  different  values.  
According to Ingersoll (2006) there are three alternative values when considering ESOs; 
market value, subjective value, and objective value. Similar classification is used in the 
majority of studies in the field. First, market value or risk-neutral value is the value the option 
would have if it were held by an un-constrained agent. This is rarely of interest when focusing 
on ESOs except when comparing the ESO pricing models against the ordinary option pricing 
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models for instance. Second, the subjective value or the value to the option holder is less than 
the market value due to option being in an undiversified portfolio and being exercised 
suboptimally from the market perspective as shown later on. Subjective value can vary from 
one  holder  to  another  due  to  differences  in  risk  aversion  and  diversification.  Third,  the  
objective value is the cost to the company who grant the options, and it recognizes the 
suboptimal exercise of option holders but not the discount due to poor diversification for 
instance. Therefore the objective value is generally considered to be somewhere between the 
market value and the subjective value. Finally, the value of option is generally considered to 
consist of two components. Intrinsic value of the options is equal to the difference between 
the value of the underlying asset and the exercise price of the option. This is also equal to the 
value realized by the option holder when the option is being exercised. Time value instead is 
the difference between the option value and the intrinsic value, and therefore the intrinsic 
value and the time value components sum up to the total value of the option. 
Pricing of traded options as presented by Black and Scholes (1973) (B-S model) relies on the 
construction of a portfolio containing a riskless asset and the underlying stock that duplicates 
the return on the options. Furthermore, Merton (1973) shows that an option on a non-dividend 
paying stock should never be exercised before the maturity to maximize the option value. In 
addition to the B-S model, a binomial model of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) provides an 
alternative method to value ordinary options. 
However, ESOs have number of features that prevent their valuation using standard option 
valuation models such as B-S model. As noted by Rubinstein (1995) and Hull and White 
(2004) for instance, most ESOs have a vesting period during which they cannot be exercised, 
and if the employee leaves the company during that period the options are forfeited. If the 
employee leaves after the vesting period, options usually need to be exercised immediately or 
they are forfeited. In addition, employees are not permitted to sell their options and generally 
not allowed to hedge their positions by taking short positions in the company’s stock. 
Therefore they need to exercise the options and sell the shares in order to realize a cash 
benefit or diversify their portfolios. Therefore the utility maximizing exercise strategy can be 
quite different from the strategy that maximizes the market value of an option and managers 
tend to exercise their options well before maturity (see for instance Huddart and Lang, 1996; 
Carpenter and Yermack, 1998; Bettis et al., 2005). Compared to the exchange traded options, 
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ESOs  have  significantly  longer  maturities  and  their  exercise  leads  to  some  dilution  as  new  
treasury stock is issued upon the exercise. Murphy (1999) shows that most employee stock 
options expire in ten years and are granted with an exercise price equal to the market price of 
the underlying stock on the date of grant. 
Majority  of  ESO  valuation  studies  focus  on  the  objective  value  of  ESOs  meaning  the  ESO  
cost to the firm. Option exercise behavior of employees affects the objective value of ESOs 
due to the changes in the option maturity, and consequently two main approaches have 
emerged how to model the exercise patterns of the option holders. Utility maximization based 
models assume that the option holders exercise their options according to the policy that 
maximizes their subjective utility. Utility-based models are presented for instance by Huddart 
(1994), Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994), and Rubinstein (1995). Binomial models developed by 
these authors model the ESO exercise scheme that maximizes the expected utility of 
employees by considering for instance the risk aversion, investment opportunities, and wealth 
of the employees. 
However, several other authors have developed so called reduced form models that model 
early exercise as an exogenous factor. Clear benefit of the reduced form models is that there is 
no need to explicitly model unobservable variables such as the risk aversion or the outside 
wealth of the employees. Nevertheless, sufficient historical data of option exercises is needed 
in  estimation  of  the  exogenous  factors.  Among others,  Carpenter  (1998),  Carr  and  Linetsky  
(2000), Hull and White (2004), and Ammann and Seiz (2004) present binomial models with 
exogenous early exercise and forfeiture. Hull and White (2004) for instance assume the early 
exercise to happen when the stock price is a certain multiple of the exercise price. 
Some of the latest literature on the subject is focused on the comparison of the utility based 
and the reduced form models. In addition to their own reduced form model, Ammann and 
Seiz (2004) include the above mentioned utility maximization based models and the reduced 
form models presented by Hull and White (2004) in their model comparison. They show that 
all of the models yield virtually identical option prices as long as they are calibrated to the 
same expected life, and therefore the method used to derive the exercise policies of the 
options holders has little effect. 
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In addition, ESO valuation by the managers, or the subjective value of ESO, is investigated in 
relation  to  the  analysis  of  the  incentive  effects  of  options.  For  an  excellent  overview of  the  
empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation see Murphy (1999). General 
view seems to support the notion of option holders valuing their options below the objective 
value of the options. Among others, Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002) show 
that ESOs can be worth substantially less to the risk averse and non-diversified employees 
than what they are worth to the issuing company.  
In contrast, some of the latest papers suggest the executives to actually price their options 
above the B-S value. Hodge et al. (2005) state that based on their interview study, managers 
systematically overvalue options relative to the B-S value, and that the overvaluation is 
associated with high expected future stock price. Sautner et al. (2010) make similar 
observations and conclude that optimism and overconfidence measures are significantly 
related to the options values, while they find no association with risk aversion. 
2.2 Mergers and acquisitions and ESO valuation 
The section browses the very limited body of research on ESO valuation in mergers and 
acquisitions. First, previous work focusing on the role of the option plans and other 
agreements in determining what happens to the options in transactions is presented. Although 
mainly from the practitioner oriented sources, these publications offer some very valuable 
information on the topic. Second, there are some theoretical academic papers that suggest 
company transactions to have an effect on ESO valuation. These papers serve an important 
purpose in providing information on how the valuation model could incorporate the threat of 
corporate transactions, and also to illustrate the potential valuation implications. 
2.2.1 Possible determinants of ESO valuation 
According to the book by Ferenczy (2008), when a company with stock options changes 
control, meaning it is involved in a merger or acquisitions for instance, something significant 
usually happens to option plans. Often the issues related to the options will primarily depend 
on what the option plan or option agreement provide, as most of the issues are contractual in 
nature. However, author also notes that the type of transaction and the relative bargaining 
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power of the executives and the shareholders will affect the outcome. Regarding the option 
plans and agreements, they usually include a change-in-control provision that defines when a 
change-in-control takes place, what triggers it, and what the consequences are. Ferenczy 
(2008)  notes  that  in  general,  at  least  an  acquisition  of  substantially  all  assets  or  merger  
constitutes the change-in-control event, but also a stake purchase of certain percentage or the 
current shareholders losing the control of the board might act as triggers. 
Ferenczy (2008) also discusses the alternative actions following the change-in-control event, 
and claims that there are generally two choices how stock options will vest on these 
situations. Either only vested options remain vested and unvested options remain 
unexercisable forever, or then all options become exercisable. A third and relatively rare 
alternative is also mentioned in which all unexercised options are terminated. Ferenczy (2008) 
also discusses the effect of the transaction type on change-in-control provisions. In 
acquisitions, it is common to give the option holders a notice of the pending transaction 
before the deal actually takes place, so that they have an opportunity to exercise their options. 
If options are not exercised before the transaction takes place, it is common for options to 
expire simultaneously. In contrast to the acquisitions, author states that in mergers it is 
common to convert the options into equivalent options in the surviving corporation based on 
the exchange ratio. Author does not discuss the issue in detail and also no explanation is given 
why the transaction type should have an effect. 
Somewhat contrary with Ferenczy (2008), the Delaware Court of Chancery suggests in its 
opinion the method of payment to affect the option valuation in the transactions, instead of the 
type of the transaction. 
“The court recognizes that, as a general rule, the value of a derivative instrument, such as a 
stock option, is tied to the value of the security into which it is exercisable. If, as the result of 
a transaction, the underlying security is converted into the right to receive a fixed sum of 
cash, the value of the option will ordinarily also be measured by reference to that same 
amount of cash.” 3 
                                               
3 Lillis v. A T & T Corp., 2007 WL 2110587 (Del. Ch., July 20, 2007) 
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In addition, the Court notes that the option agreements are no more or less than contracts that 
must be construed in accordance with normal rules of contract interpretation. Taken together, 
the Court opinion implies that underwater stock options may be cancelled for no 
consideration in a change-in-control transaction without the option holder’s consent unless the 
option plan specifically states otherwise. The rationale is further enforced by the opinion of 
the Delaware Supreme Court 
“In  the  case  of  a  stock  for  stock  merger,  option  holders  expect  to  have  their  old  options  
replaced with new options because the old (underlying) stock is being replaced with new 
(underlying) stock. In such a transaction, by its very nature, the “economic position” of the 
options will invariably incorporate the expected time value of the new options. But where the 
stock  and  the  options  are  to  be  cashed  out  in  a  merger,  the  option  holders  can  have  no  
expectation of receiving replacement options in new stock. Instead, option holders will, and 
expect to, receive only cash representing intrinsic value for their options.” 4 
Going forward, a survey conducted by The National Association of Stock Plan Professionals 
(NASPP) and Deloitte Consulting LLP (2007) on to the use of equity awards sheds some light 
on the change-in-control practices. Over 500 companies granting equity awards responded to 
the questionnaire, most of them being headquartered in the US. Regarding the questions on 
the  vesting  of  awards  in  change-in-control  situations,  54%  of  respondents  state  that  the  
vesting is automatically accelerated on all unvested awards and 17% say that vesting is 
automatically accelerated for a portion of unvested awards. However, these actions can be 
undertaken at the discretion of the board in 32% and 30% of companies correspondingly. 
Concerning the actual treatment and the value the option holders can receive, 7% of 
companies say that awards are automatically paid in cash and 14% say that awards are 
automatically assumed by the acquirer (essentially meaning the same as converting options to 
equivalent options in the surviving company as discussed earlier). Again, these actions can be 
undertaken at the discretion of the board in 31% and 35% of the companies correspondingly. 
Finally, in line with Ferenczy (2008) only 2% say that awards are automatically canceled for 
no compensation, whereas this can be done at the discretion of the board in 22% of the 
respondents. 
                                               
4AT & T Corp. v. Lillis,  (Del. Supr., May 22, 2008)  
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From the results one can draw rather good understanding of different methods and notice that 
treatment is in no means universal. Perhaps the most interesting observation is that the boards 
of directors seem to have a great discretion over the actions following the change-in-control 
events. In addition, simply looking at the agreements do not tell the whole story, as companies 
and option holders might actually negotiate resolution other than dictated by the agreements. 
When interpreting the results, one should note that NASPP survey does not have separate data 
for options and other equity awards, and the definition of change-in-control can vary between 
companies. However, it was noted by the Editor of NASPP that most companies use the same 
change-in-control provisions for all types of equity awards issued under the same plan (89% 
of companies answered have a plan that allows to issue various awards under the one plan). 
Report by Frederic W. Cook & Co. (2005), a compensation consultancy, takes somewhat 
different approach in investigating change-in-control provisions as they look at the actual 
agreements that companies have filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and analyze the provisions of the top 50 NYSE and Nasdaq companies. The report 
mainly focuses on other aspects of executive compensation than options, such as severance 
payments and health and welfare benefits, but it still offers some interesting insights. It is 
reported that 85% of the companies in their sample provide some type of change-in-control 
protection, typically provided through both individual agreements and plan agreements. 
Relatively more companies quoted on NYSE do not have any provisions compared to 
companies listed on Nasdaq. This is explained in the report by the higher average market 
capitalization of NYSE companies and hence a lower threat of being an acquisition target. 
According to the report, most common triggers used to define change-in-control are: 
- Change in the majority of members of the Board of Directors 
- Sale of all or substantially all of the company’s assets 
- Liquidation or dissolution of the company 
- Voting power acquisition 
- Merger, consolidation or reorganization 
 
First three are reported to be ‘standard definitions’ in all arrangements, while the definitions 
of the last two vary. Interestingly, in case of a voting power acquisition, most Nasdaq 
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companies use 50% voting power as a trigger for change-in-control, whereas the 
corresponding figure for the NYSE companies is 20%. In addition, some companies have a 
provision specifying that a change-in-control only takes place if ownership of former owners 
decreases below certain limit. In this case the majority of both Nasdaq and NYSE companies 
use 50% threshold, although among NYSE companies also higher values are observed, 
meaning that a change-in-control is more likely to take place even with buyer owning a 
smaller share of the company. Based on these observations authors conclude that Nasdaq 
companies have more stringent standards in what comes to the change-in-control provisions. 
In addition, the report studies the acceleration of equity incentive plans when change-in-
control takes place. In 64% of cases the vesting of equity awards is accelerated and in 20% of 
cases vesting is accelerated given the ‘double trigger’ provision, meaning involuntary 
termination such as firing of option holder following the change-in-control. For the rest of the 
cases acceleration only takes place at the discretion of committee, obviously referring to the 
compensation committee of board of directors. Results are very similar for both Nasdaq and 
NYSE. Report fails to describe how situations with different treatments for different kinds of 
equity awards are handled, and they only collect the information from the equity plans instead 
of individual agreements. 
Results reported by Equilar (2009), a consultancy, are in the same vein with the findings of 
Frederic W. Cook & Co. (2005). Equilar (2009) studies severance and change-in-control 
payments at Fortune 100 companies, using proxy statements filed by the companies as a 
source. Results are reported separately for different equity awards, and it is shown that among 
CEOs, provisions offering full acceleration of options following change-in-control is found in 
90.1% of companies and partial acceleration in 4.2% of companies. Values reported for stock 
and performance shares are lower, which can explain the slightly different results compared to 
the results of Frederic W. Cook & Co. (2005) that investigates equity awards in general. 
In sum, it is clear that option plans and agreements have a big role in determining what 
constitutes a change-in-control and consequently what can happen to the options thereafter. 
However, board of directors can often decide on something else as well, and obviously 
acquirer can also seek other resolutions with the option holders. Therefore I consider change-
in-control provisions to generally form a lower bound for the option values in corporate 
transactions. 
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2.2.2 Possible implications to ESO valuation 
Several authors discuss the threat of takeover and its effect on option value. Considering 
traded options, Black (1989) states the B-S option pricing model being used in situations 
where there should be a large difference between the market prices and the prices provided by 
the  model,  such  as  when  a  cash  takeover  is  likely  to  end  the  life  of  the  option  or  warrant.  
Jennergren and Näslund (1996) consider options whose lives are stochastic because the option 
contracts can be prematurely cancelled, and develop an extension of the B-S formula that 
incorporates the stochastic life feature. Example of such a situation is when the option holder 
leaves her job and the stock options are forfeited. With traded options instead, the stochastic 
life feature can follow from a possibility of company being taken over or being involved in a 
merger, as many exchanges will terminate the option contracts if there is a cash settlement. 
However, if the shareholders receive shares of the acquiring company, then the option 
contract is transferred to an equivalent amount of acquirer shares and the maturity remains the 
same. I verify the claims by looking at the rules of NYSE Liffe5, and find that in stock only 
deals the exercise price and the number of shares the options entitle to, are generally adjusted 
using the exchange ratio. Instead, in cash deals the options are settled at their theoretical fair 
value calculated with the Cox Ross Rubenstein option valuation method (the binomial 
model). These rules, however, can vary from one exchange to another and due to the short 
maturities of the traded options the impact of merger or acquisition is less severe compared to 
the ESOs.  
Yet a few papers mention the possibility of company being bought and consequently the 
effect on ESO value as the vesting conditions are relaxed. Maller et al. (2002) make an 
assumption of ESOs typically vesting following a takeover bid despite the performance or 
vesting criteria of options. Similar to Jennergren and Näslund (1996), authors consider a 
takeover to be another early exercise event similar to the employee departure. Although not 
included in their valuation model, authors suggest modeling the probability of a takeover 
similar to the modeling of the employee departure. Furthermore, authors note that forgiving 
valuable vesting conditions in the event of a takeover is not costless to shareholders when 
they remain shareholders of the combined entity. Szimayer (2004) takes a step further and 
                                               
5 NYSE Liffe’s Corporate Actions Policy, version 5.0 (December 22, 2009). 
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presents a reduced form model that incorporates both the possibility of employee departure 
and of takeover, since according to the author both events terminate the ESO contract. 
Szimayer (2004) argues that the main difference between the takeover and the employee 
departure is that a takeover prior the vesting of ESOs assigns option a certain value, whereas 
early  departure  forfeits  the  option.  In  addition  to  assuming  a  fixed  cash  payment  for  the  
unvested ESOs, author models the takeover after vesting to result in options being exercised 
and the option holders receiving an additional fixed cash payment. As a side note, Szimayer 
(2004) also states that in general a takeover increases the value of an ESO, although no 
explicit reasoning is provided. Along the lines, also Ingersoll (2006) notes that many 
incentive  stock  options  vest  sooner  or  even  immediately  in  events  such  as  sale,  IPO  or  
merger. 
In addition, empirical evidence suggests company restructurings to be of importance when 
considering the ESO valuation. Ikäheimo et al. (2006) use data of listed ESOs in Finland to 
compare market values and theoretical B-S model values. Surprisingly they find markets to 
value ESOs significantly below the value predicted by the B-S model even though listed 
ESOs can be owned by investors who are not constrained by the same restrictions than the 
managers. In addition, listed ESOs are always fully vested and therefore not anymore 
forfeited if the employee leaves the company, and hence one would assume the market prices 
to be very close to the B-S values. Deviations of as much as 50% are reported and the average 
difference is almost 15%. Authors identify a number of factors to affect the price differential. 
They find time to expiration to have a major influence on the undervaluation and suggest the 
possibility of change in the corporate structure to lower the cost of ESOs to shareholders. 
ESOs are assumed to expire in case of merger resulting to the loss of time value of options. 
Urtti (2009) further studies ESOs in corporate transactions in Finland between 2000 and 2009. 
Author identifies 45 mergers and acquisitions in which target company has options and finds 
out that in only three cases B-S valuation model is used to determine the pay-off and in five 
cases the market price of listed ESO is used as a basis for the valuation. In 22 cases option 
holders are either paid the intrinsic value or given a possibility to exercise options prior to 
transaction, effectively yielding the same outcome from the valuation point of view. In 
addition, in seven cases a certain minimum price was paid in instead of the intrinsic value if 
option were out-of-the-money. In the rest of the cases, the valuation method was either not 
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disclosed or there were no modifications to the options. Author concludes that no uniform 
rule is used in option valuation in corporate transactions and that the hypothesis of Ikäheimo 
et al. (2006) of lost time value of ESOs could be studied further. 
In sum, to some extent the previous literature addresses the issue of option valuation in 
corporate transactions, but mainly concentrates on the effects to the vesting of ESOs. 
Although this could be the case, the possibility of ESOs being valued in a completely 
different  way  from  transaction  to  another  is  suggested  at  least  by  Ferenczy  (2008)  and  the  
Court of Delaware. Surveys and reports by practitioners indicate that option plans and 
agreements can have an essential role in determining how options are valued when change-in-
control takes place, but they also stress that a great amount of latitude still exists. 
2.3 Accounting valuation of ESOs 
This section discusses the accounting valuation of ESOs and explains the treatment and 
expensing from the viewpoint of two main accounting standards issued by Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
FASB is the standard setter in the US and it issues Statements of Financial Accountings 
Standards (SFAS), whereas IASB is a London based organization that issues International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that are used in the European Union and in the United 
Kingdom for instance. Although the two accounting standards are very close to each other 
regarding the treatment of ESOs, the main focus here will be on the standards issued by the 
US organization FASB as the data used in this study are from the US as well. 
In US, prior to the issuance of the current accounting standards on ESO expensing, SFAS 123 
allowed companies to use the measurement approach of Accounting Principles Board Opinion 
No. 25 (APB 25). APB 25 allowed companies to use the intrinsic value method in expensing 
stock options, where the expense is equal to the difference between the share price and the 
exercise price of the option at the grant date. As Murphy (1999) shows, it is a common 
practice  to  set  exercise  price  equal  to  share  price  at  the  time  of  issuance  and  therefore  
companies avoided showing any option related expenses on their income statements. Other 
alternative was to use grant date fair value method recommended by SFAS 123 where option 
expense equals to the intrinsic value and the time value of options, calculated with an option 
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pricing model. According to Brown and Lee (2007) most companies chose to use the intrinsic 
value method, yet the grant date fair values were still mandatory to be disclosed in the 
footnotes. 
In response to the rapidly growing use of the options and in their efforts to harmonize the US 
and the international accounting standards in regard to the equity awards, FASB and IASB 
issued standards related to fair value accounting in 2004. Both IFRS 2 and SFAS 123 revised 
(SFAS 123R) require firms to recognize the cost of employee stock option grants using grant 
date fair value. Neither of the standards requires using some certain approach in deriving the 
fair value, but SFAS 123R for instance states that 
“A lattice model (for example, a binomial model) and a closed-form model (for example, the 
Black & Scholes-Merton formula) are among the valuation techniques that meet the criteria 
required by this Statement for estimating the fair values of employee share options and 
similar instruments… This Statement does not specify a preference for a particular valuation 
technique or model in estimating the fair values of employee share options and similar 
instruments”. 
However, based on my reading of hundreds of annual and quarterly reports of the companies 
included in the sample of this study, an overwhelming majority of companies apply the B-S 
model and only a few companies have adopted the use of the binomial model or Monte Carlo 
simulation to derive the option expense. 
All the ESO valuation models discussed earlier in the chapter that aim to determine the 
objective value of the stock options, are developed to estimate the cost to the issuing 
company. The models consider the parameters required by the SFAS 123 and now SFAS 
123R that include the exercise price of the option, contractual life of the option, price of the 
underlying share at the grant date, expected volatility of the share price, expected dividends or 
expected dividend yield, risk-free interest rate, and the effects of early exercise by employees. 
In closed-form models such as the widely applied B- S model, the early exercise is taken into 
account by estimating the expected life of the option, while in the binomial model the 
expected life is an output of the model. In regard to the expected life, in addition to the 
previous exercise patterns of employees for instance, any other relevant information can be 
considered as stated in SFAS 123R. 
18 
 
 
 
“[SFAS 123R] requires that the fair value of an employee share option or similar instrument 
be based on its expected term, rather than its contractual term… However, expected term 
might be estimated in some other manner, taking into account whatever relevant and 
supportable information is available, including industry averages and other pertinent 
evidence such as published academic research.” 
Requirement to expense ESOs seem to have triggered many insensible actions by companies, 
when considering that the changes should not have any effect on the firm value if investors 
have been able to determine the same information already prior to the fair value accounting 
from the footnotes of the companies. Despite the guidance of the accounting standards, 
managers can still use discretion over the valuation model assumptions used in determining 
the ESO values. As a consequence, an emerging body of research suggests that managers 
opportunistically use allowable discretion to bias ESO fair values downward especially to 
manage the reported earnings. Aboody et al. (2006) examine four key option valuation inputs 
disclosed following the footnote disclosure of SFAS 123. These include expected option life, 
expected volatility, expected dividend yield and the risk-free interest rate. Authors find firms 
to underestimate the disclosed ESO expenses by understating the above mentioned valuation 
model inputs. As firms have greatest latitude in determining the expected option life and stock 
price volatility, the evidence supports strongest discretion for these inputs. Johnston (2006) 
documents discretion over volatility only and Hodder et al. (2006) find that on average firms 
choosing assumptions that underestimate the ESO values have incentives to manage earnings 
and to camouflage the size and the value of compensation packages. 
Choudhary et al. (2009) show that companies accelerated the vesting of ESOs before SFAS 
123R becoming effective to avoid recognizing existing unvested ESOs at fair value in the 
financial statements. Authors report the likelihood of the accelerated vesting to be higher if 
acceleration has a greater effect on the future ESO compensation expense, and if the firms 
suffer greater agency problems. In addition, there is a negative stock price reaction around the 
announcement of the acceleration decision indicating wealth transfer from owners to ESO 
holders. In addition, Brown and Lee (2007) examine factors associated with firms’ decisions 
to cut back on option based compensation around the issuance of SFAS 123R. They 
document reduction in the use of ESOs to be associated with the level of ESO expenses to be 
recognized, strength of corporate governance, institutional ownership, debt contracting 
concerns, and pressure to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. 
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Stock  option  expensing  is  also  shown to  have  material  effect  on  the  diluted  earnings  of  the  
companies. According to Botosan and Plumlee (2001) the median reduction in diluted 
earnings per share due to expensing of stock options is 14% and reduction in return on assets 
is 13.6 %. Their data set consists of 100 companies identified to be ‘America’s Fastest-
Growing Companies’ by Fortune magazine, probably causing upward bias to the figures. Also 
other studies find significant effects on diluted earnings. For instance, Street and Cereola 
(2004) investigate effects on companies reporting under IFRS and find average annual stock 
option expense recognition on diluted EPS to be approximately 40% with large variation 
between the countries. Similarly Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) reported negative effect of 
approximately 20% on Australian companies’ financial performance ratios and interestingly 
find that the materiality of the impact is neither industry specific nor restricted to high growth 
firms. 
In sum, changes in the accounting standards have lead to a significant number of studies on 
ESO valuation and on implications to the firms. Although the standards provide thorough 
guidance on deriving the value of ESOs, companies are still free to use any valuation model 
that fulfills the requirements and also significantly affect the way the parameters are 
estimated. 
3. Research design and data 
This chapter starts by presenting the research design of the empirical section of the study. In 
addition, I describe in detail how the sample is selected and data collected. Finally, sample 
summary statistics of the transactions and various acquirer and target characteristics are 
presented. 
3.1 Research design 
Empirical section of the study is composed of two parts. In the first part, I construct a sample 
of transactions for which I hand collect the information on ESO valuation methods from the 
disclosures of the companies. Sample of ESO valuation methods includes all employee stock 
options issued by the companies, and therefore the sample includes both the options granted 
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to the executives and other employees of the firm, as well as the options granted both to the 
current and to the former employees. However, if different valuation methods are applied to 
options issued under different option plans or different holder groups, such as executives and 
other employees, a corresponding number of valuation method observations is recorded. 
Based on these data, alternative valuation methods are identified and discussed, and the 
results on the overall use of valuation methods are presented. In addition, I classify the 
valuation methods in two categories based on whether the time value component of the option 
is lost or retained. 
In the second part, I strive to identify the determinants of ESO valuation methods in mergers 
and acquisitions, and consequently whether the time value of options is either retained or lost. 
First, I identify possible determinants based on the previous studies and other related 
evidence. The association between the identified determinants and the valuation methods is 
then investigated and the univariate evidence is presented and discussed. Second, using the 
identified determinants a multivariate analysis is conducted by estimating logistic regression 
models in which the dependent variable indicates whether or not the options lose their  time 
value in the transaction. 
3.2 Selection of sample transactions 
Data set consists of mergers and acquisitions in 2008 and 2009, in which target is publicly 
listed on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq). 
This constitutes a perfect setting for the study, as the US is an active market for mergers and 
acquisitions, and as shown by Murphy (1999), the majority of publicly listed US companies 
use options as part of the compensation.  
Due to strict reporting environment in the US enforced by SEC, I anticipate the information 
on  corporate  actions  to  be  extensively  disclosed  and  the  disclosures  to  be  readily  available  
making the data collection feasible. Also, compared to the Europe for instance, disclosures are 
invariably available in English. From the accounting point of view, the US market also 
constitutes an interesting sample to investigate following the adoption of SFAS 123R and the 
fair value accounting of option grants. 
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Transactions  to  be  included  in  the  sample  do  not  need  to  be  completed,  and  therefore  the  
sample consists of pending, withdrawn, completed and partially completed deals. This 
removes any selection bias that might result from including only the successful deals. After 
imposing a restriction of target being publicly listed, sample includes no subsidiary sales, 
asset sales or other types of divestitures. These events are not likely to trigger any change-in-
control provisions and therefore no adjustments are made to the option contracts. Acquirer 
instead can be an entity of any type, such as a public or private company, a fund, or a trust. 
As the data collection for the selected transactions is extremely time consuming, I aim to 
construct a sample with good hit rate for the option valuation method information. Initial list 
of transactions in 2008 and 2009 with NYSE or Nasdaq listed target includes 2,322 
transactions. This list is further filtered by removing transactions that are classified as 
repurchases, self tenders, or stake purchases, as I anticipate the repurchases and self tenders to 
have little impact on stock options. Same applies to stake purchases that are unlikely to trigger 
the change-in-control provisions, since the buyer is not seeking to acquire the majority of the 
shares or is only increasing its stake after already having a majority ownership. Also deals 
with undisclosed dollar value and deals classified as intended are excluded since there is not 
likely to be a formal offer available. Procedure leaves us with 445 transactions. Transactions 
flagged as restructurings, debt restructurings, or target being bankrupt, are excluded resulting 
to 412 transactions.  
Table I 
Filtering of the transaction sample 
Table shows filtering of transactions to be included in the sample and for which the option valuation information in 
transactions is collected. Initial sample consists of mergers and acquisitions in 2008 and 2009. 
Target listed in Nasdaq or NYSE (years 2008 and 2009)  2,322 
Repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, undisclosed dollar value, intended transactions – 1,886 
Restructurings, debt restructurings, and bankrupt targets – 24 
Misclassified in the database – 29 
Target has no options – 2 
Sample for which option valuation data collected 381 
 
Furthermore, I identify and exclude 29 misclassified transactions that should have been 
excluded based on the discussed criteria. Most of the misclassified transactions are cases in 
which the stock exchange of target is misclassified, deal is represented more than once in a 
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data set, or cases in which buyer is not actually seeking to acquire a majority6.  In case of a 
duplicate event of one buyer-acquirer combination existing multiple times in the data set, only 
the most recent one is included. However, if there are multiple companies bidding for one 
company, all of these are included in the sample as individual events. Finally, in two cases the 
target does not have any stock options outstanding are excluded. Filtering of sample as 
summarized in Table I yields 383 transactions for which the option valuation data are 
collected. Among the excluded transactions, a clear majority of the events are repurchases 
while the second largest group of excluded events is stake purchases.  
3.3 Data collection and sources of data 
Two main sources of data are utilized in the study. Transaction data is retrieved from the SDC 
Platinum database, whereas the company disclosures including the information on ESO 
valuation in a given transaction are hand-collected via EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system) of SEC. 
In  addition  to  retrieving  the  list  of  transaction  from  SDC  Platinum  following  the  above  
discussed  criteria,  I  also  retrieve  a  range  of  transaction  related  variables  from SDC that  are  
later on used in the investigation of valuation method determinants. Most important variables 
are  the  method  of  payment,  form  of  transaction,  and  various  target  and  acquirer  
characteristics. Also the transaction value is retrieved from the same source. 
Disclosures filed with SEC are used to determine the ESO valuation method in a transaction. 
The SEC rules require disclosures about the proposed merger or acquisition whether or not it 
is completed. With mergers, if a shareholder vote is required, the information can be found 
from the proxy statement on Form Schedule 14A or from the information statement on Form 
Schedule 14C. In addition, issuers must file documents relating to merger agreements such as 
the definitive merger agreement. This and other material about the merger will be included as 
exhibits to the Form 8-K or subsequent quarterly or annual report filed on Form 10-Q or 10-K 
respectively. Most of the time the ESO valuation method is found from the definitive merger 
                                               
6 In few cases only convertible shares or warrants are bought where no change-in-control provisions are 
triggered until they are exercised at some point in the future. These cases are also excluded. 
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agreement under Form 8-K, although the same agreement is usually disclosed under other 
forms as well such as proxy statements if a shareholder vote is required. 
With  tender  offers,  parties  who  will  own  more  than  five  percent  of  the  securities  of  a  firm  
must  file  a  Schedule  TO  with  the  SEC.  The  target  company  must  file  with  the  SEC  its  
response to the tender offer on Form Schedule 14D-9. In many cases the tender offer itself do 
not  outline  the  final  ESO  valuation  method,  as  it  is  later  on  negotiated  with  the  company  
being acquired and then disclosed in a mutual definitive agreement. Therefore, if a tender 
offer is not successful the information regarding the option valuation may not available. 
Both  Nasdaq  and  NYSE rules  require  shareholder  vote  when material  changes  are  made  to  
option plans. However, it is stated in a SEC release discussing the NYSE and Nasdaq rules 
that “shareholder approval will not be required to convert, replace or adjust outstanding 
options or other equity-compensation awards to reflect the transaction”.7 Therefore 
information on option valuation in corporate transactions is not usually found from the proxy 
statements of the firms, unless some extraordinary adjustments are being made. 
In addition to option valuation method, two other variables are collected for the transactions 
with option valuation method available. First, remaining life of all outstanding options is 
collected from companies’ annual or quarterly reports, forms 10-K and 10-Q respectively. 
This value indicates the option amount weighted average remaining contractual life for the 
options, basically meaning the remaining time to maturity of the options. Second, I collect the 
expected life of options from the same filings that indicate the value the company is using in 
B-S model for the fair value calculations. Variable is collected for the most recent time 
period, so if the filing presents the expected life variable for the last three years separately, the 
most recent one is collected. 
For the remaining life and the expected life variables the latest report, either annual or 
quarterly, is used. Sometimes companies do not disclose either or both of the variables in their 
quarterly reports, in which case the latest annual report is used to find the missing variable or 
variables. Companies using valuation model other than B-S, such as Binomial model or 
                                               
7 SEC Release No. 34-48108; File Nos. SR-NYSE-2002-46 and SR-NASD-2002-140, June 30, 2003. 
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Monte Carlo simulation, do not necessarily disclose the expected life of options as that is not 
used as an input in the calculations. 
3.4 Summary statistics 
Table II presents the statistics for certain sample characteristics related to transactions. All 
variables  are  dichotomous  and  therefore  the  reported  values  equal  to  the  proportion  of  that  
characteristic in the whole sample, and in NYSE and Nasdaq subsamples (defined by the 
stock exchange of the target company). In addition, the difference in the proportions and the 
statistical significance of the association between each of the characteristics and target 
exchange subsamples is reported. 
Table II 
Descriptive statistics of mergers and acquisitions in 2008 and 2009 
Table shows descriptive statistics for mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on 
either Nasdaq or NYSE (N=381). Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended 
transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, and no target options. Reported values are 
delineated by the target stock exchange. All variables are dichotomous; Year 2009, equal to one if transaction announced on 
2009; Completed, equal to one if transaction is (partially) completed; Stock,  equal  to  one  if  stock  is  used  as  method  of  
payment; Cash, equal to one if cash is used as method of payment; Cash and Stock, equal to one if both cash and stock are 
used; Tender Offer, equal to one if tender offer is being made; Public Acquirer, equal to one if acquirer is publicly listed; US 
Acquirer, equal to one if acquirer nation is US. Reported p-values for the differences between NYSE and Nasdaq samples 
based on the Pearson Ȥ2 (1df) test for independence of categories. All data from SDC Platinum database. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
All 
 
NYSE 
 
Nasdaq 
 Difference  p-value 
 
(N = 381) 
 
(N = 88) 
 
(N = 293) 
  Year 2009 0.415 
 
0.409 
 
0.416 
 
-0.007 
 
0.751 
Completed 0.606 
 
0.557 
 
0.621 
 
-0.064 
 
0.279 
Cash 0.790 
 
0.727 
 
0.809 
 
-0.082 
 
0.099* 
Stock 0.302 
 
0.511 
 
0.239 
 
0.272 
 
0.000*** 
Cash and Stock 0.181 
 
0.307 
 
0.143 
 
0.163 
 
0.000*** 
Tender Offer 0.223 
 
0.136 
 
0.249 
 
-0.113 
 
0.026** 
Public Acquirer 0.617 
 
0.750 
 
0.577 
 
0.173 
 
0.003*** 
US Acquirer 0.892   0.864   0.901   -0.037   0.321 
 
From Table II, number of transactions announced is lower in 2009 than 2008, and out of all 
transactions 60.6% are completed or partially completed. See Appendix A for monthly 
transaction activity. For neither of the variables, there are no large differences between the 
NYSE and Nasdaq subsamples. In comparison, Schwert (2000) studies transactions in which 
target firms are listed on NYSE or AMEX during 1975 and 1996 show that 75% of the deals 
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in the sample are completed. Yet one should note that 19% of the transactions in the sample 
of this study are still pending so the eventual fraction of completed deals is likely to increase. 
Considering the method of payment, cash is used in 79.0% and stock is used in 30.2% of the 
transactions. Both cash and stock are used in 18.1%, implying that the proportions of cash 
only and stock only transactions equal to 60.9% and 12.1% respectively. The association 
between the method of payment characteristics and the target exchange are all statistically 
significant. In NYSE subsample the share of stock deals is significantly higher compared to 
the Nasdaq sample and well correspond with the statistics reported by Schwert (2000) for 
instance. Author reports 58% of transactions to be paid in cash only compared to 24% of 
transactions in which only stock is used as method of payment. 
Tender  offer  is  conducted  in  22.3% of  all  transactions  while  the  rest  of  the  transactions  are  
classified as mergers. There is also a statistically significant association between making a 
tender offer and the target exchange. When target is listed on Nasdaq, tender offer is 
conducted in 24.9% of the cases whereas for NYSE subsample the corresponding value is 
only 13.6%.  Looking at the acquirer characteristics, in 61.7% of transactions acquirer is 
publicly listed and there is a statistically significant 17.3 percentage point difference between 
NYSE and Nasdaq subsamples. 
Panel A in Table III presents statistics for certain characteristics of target companies in the 
sample. Average and median transaction values are significantly higher for NYSE listed 
targets and the association is statistically significant. For instance, median transaction value in 
Nasdaq is $124 million, whereas in NYSE it is $2,635 million. Similarly, based on the total 
asset value, companies listed on NYSE are significantly larger compared to the Nasdaq 
companies. Transaction value and the value of total assets for the whole sample are much 
closer to the Nasdaq subsample values, as the majority of transactions in the sample have a 
Nasdaq listed target (76.9%). 
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Table III 
Target characteristics in mergers and acquisitions in 2008 and 2009 
Table shows descriptive statistics for mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on 
either Nasdaq or NYSE (N=381). Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended 
transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, and no target options. In Panel A, Transaction 
Value equals to the total value of consideration offered. 1-Day Premium calculated with offer value and previous day closing 
price.. In Panel B, option Remaining Life and Expected Life are collected from most recent annual or quarterly report filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to the announcement of transaction. Option moneyness is  defined  as  
max[(offer value - average strike price)/average strike price, 0]. Reported p-values for the differences between NYSE and 
Nasdaq samples based on the two tailed t-test for means and Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test for medians. All data are not 
available for all observations. All data from SDC Platinum database unless otherwise stated. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Panel A: Transaction characteristics 
        
  
All 
 
NYSE 
 
Nasdaq 
 
Difference  p-value 
Transaction Value ($M) 
         
 
N 381 
 
88 293 
  
 
Mean 1,985 
 
6,532 620 5,912 0.000*** 
 
Median 201 
 
2,635 124 2,511 0.000*** 
 
Standard Deviation 6,747 
 
12,100 2,742 9,358 
 Total Assets, LTM ($M) 
      
 
N 378 
 
88 290 
  
 
Mean 5,407 
 
21,875 410 21,465 0.000*** 
 
Median 165 
 
1,760 99 1,661 0.000*** 
 
Standard Deviation 45,323 
 
92,410 1,155 91,254 
 1-Day Premium (%) 
      
 
N 357 
 
87 270 
  
 
Mean 47.4 
 
30.2 53.0 -22.8 0.005*** 
 
Median 34.9 
 
32.6 36.7 -4.2 0.023** 
 
Standard Deviation 65.7 
 
40.4 71.2 -30.8 
 Panel B: Stock option characteristics               
 
  
All 
 
NYSE 
 
Nasdaq 
 
Difference 
 
p-value 
Remaining Life (years) 
      
 
N 293 65 228 
   
 
Mean 5.66 5.23 5.78 -0.55 
 
0.023** 
 
Median 5.70 5.40 5.80 -0.40 
 
0.021** 
 
Standard Deviation 1.72 1.71 1.71 0.01 
  Expected Life (years) 
      
 
N 279 61 218 
   
 
Mean 5.30 5.15 5.34 -0.20 
 
0.309 
 
Median 5.10 5.00 5.20 -0.20 
 
0.226 
 
Standard Deviation 1.35 1.18 1.39 -0.22 
  Moneyness 
      
 
N 271 76 195 
   
 
Mean 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.02 
 
0.935 
 
Median 0.40 0.30 0.40 -0.10 
 
0.276 
  Standard Deviation 1.86  2.12  1.76  0.37   
  
Interestingly there is also some variation in the target one-day premiums between the two 
exchanges, measured as the difference between the previous day closing price and the offer 
value. In Nasdaq median premium is 36.7% whereas in NYSE the corresponding value is 
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32.6%. This is likely to be related to the fact of larger and more mature companies trading in 
NYSE, compared to more technology focused Nasdaq. Andrade et al. (2001) report similar 
premiums in transactions with both the acquirer and the target being publicly listed and US 
based firms.8 According to the authors, median premium paid during the years from 1990 to 
1998 was 34.5%, only 0.4 percentage points below the median premium in this study. 
Panel B in Table III presents summary statistics for the target stock option related variables. 
The mean and median remaining life of the options is 5.7 years. Remaining life equals to the 
option amount weighted average of all outstanding options of the company. Mean value 
among the NYSE companies is 0.55 years lower than among the Nasdaq companies, and the 
difference in means is statistically significant. As shown in Figure I, the distribution of the 
remaining lives is slightly skewed to the right, probably resulting from the fact that the option 
holders tend to exercise their options prior to the contractual maturity. Yet the values of 
remaining life range from below one to almost ten years, which is in line with the results 
reported by Murphy (1999) who shows that the majority of companies issue options with 
maturity of ten years.  Going forward, the distribution of expected lives in Figure I, an 
estimate used by companies in option fair value calculations looks very different from the 
remaining life distribution as the values are more concentrated around the mean. 
Finally, Figure I presents the frequency distribution of moneyness factor that I define as 
»¼
º
«¬
ª  0,max
priceStrike
priceStrikevalueOfferMoneyness  (1) 
where offer value refers to the final offer value per common share in monetary terms and the 
strike price refers to average strike price for options outstanding. Approach loosely follows 
Carter and Lynch (2001) who use a measure for options being out-of-the-money. Moneyness 
indicates how many fold the intrinsic value is compared to the strike price, and therefore in-
the-money options assume values greater than zero. As there is no information available for 
out-of-the-money options in the data set, moneyness variable always assumes value of zero if 
all options are out-of-the-money. 
                                               
8 Included are companies listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 
and Nasdaq. 
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Panel A: Remaining life of options (years) Panel B: Expected life of options (years) 
Panel C: Option moneyness  
 
Figure I: Distributions of target stock option variables  
Figures show the frequency distributions for certain stock option related variables for the target company in mergers and 
acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self 
tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt 
target, and no target options. Remaining Life (N=293) and Expected Life (N=273) are collected from most recent annual or 
quarterly report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to the announcement of transaction. Remaining Life 
is the option amount weighted average contractual time to expiration and Expected Life is the estimate used in fair value 
calculations for the most recent period. Option moneyness (N=263, 24 extreme observations with values above five are omitted 
from  the  histogram)  is  defined  as  max[(offer  value  -  average strike price)/average strike price, 0] for which the data are 
retrieved from SDC Platinum database. 
 
From Figure I, the values of moneyness factor in Panel C are heavily skewed to the left that is 
mainly due to assigning a value of zero for the out-of-the-money options. First bar on the left 
stands for the options with the strike price above the offer value, representing 26.9% of the 
observations. For the same reason the mean value reported in Table III must be interpreted 
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with caution, and the median value of 0.40 provides a better understanding of the moneyness 
among the sample firms. Value of 0.40 indicates that the offer value exceeds the average 
strike price of options of that particular company by 40%. In comparison with the reported 
median premium of 34.9%, it seems that prior the transaction the median moneyness is likely 
to be significantly lower.  
4. ESO valuation methods in mergers and acquisitions 
This section presents the results on the use of different ESO valuation methods in mergers and 
acquisitions. I first depict the different valuation methods identified among the transactions 
and how they are categorized. Then I move on showing how frequently each of the methods is 
used. 
4.1 Identified valuation methods 
Each identified method is thoroughly explained and illustrative examples from the disclosures 
are given. Names assigned for the different groups of valuation methods are to some extent 
self-invented, and the same terminology might not be used in all the offers, agreements, and 
option contracts. More importantly, classification is not based on the technical treatment of 
the options, but on implications to option value. If for instance the option value is derived in a 
same manner, but the holder receives either cash or stock in consideration, these cases are 
classified under the same category. 
4.1.1 Intrinsic value 
When intrinsic value of options is paid, the option holder only receives a payment equal to the 
offer value over the exercise price of the option. In case the options are out-of-the-money they 
are cancelled for no consideration. In all cash transactions the offer value is simply the cash 
offer being tendered to the stockholders. If both cash and stock are offered or if the 
transaction is a stock for stock deal, the acquirer share price is used to determine the cash 
equivalent offer value. Acquirer share price is usually defined as an average closing price 
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during the last few days preceding the closing of the deal, but in some cases only the last 
closing price or even the maximum price during the preceding 60 day period is used. 9 
Intrinsic value method was used in an acquisition by Pfizer of Wyeth. 
“By virtue of the Merger, each option to purchase shares of Company Common Stock under 
the applicable Company Stock Plans that is outstanding immediately prior to the Effective 
Time, whether or not then vested and exercisable (collectively, the “Options” or “Company 
Stock Options”) shall become fully vested and exercisable immediately prior to, and then 
shall be canceled at, the Effective Time, and the holder thereof shall, subject to Section 
1.9(f), be entitled to receive an amount in cash equal to the product of (i) the excess, if any, 
of (1) the Per Share Amount over (2) the exercise price per share of Company Common 
Stock subject to such Option, with the aggregate amount of such payment rounded up to the 
nearest cent, and (ii) the total number of shares of Company Common Stock subject to such 
fully vested and exercisable Option as in effect immediately prior to the Effective Time (the 
“Option Consideration”). The Option Consideration shall be paid in a lump sum as soon as 
practicable after the Effective Time but in no event later than ten (10) Business Days 
following the Effective Time.” 10 
In nearly all of the cases the intrinsic value is paid to all options whether vested or not. 
However, in some occasions the intrinsic value is paid to vested options only. In these cases 
only holders of vested options receive a payment, and unvested options are simply terminated 
without any consideration. There are also offers that promise the payment only to the vested 
options, but further add that all accelerated vesting provisions are taken into account without 
specifying to which options this applies. Also the transactions stating that all options are 
terminated with no payment are classified to the same category, as effectively the situation is 
the same as the holder can exercise the vested portion of the options prior to the deal. All of 
these transactions are classified as ‘Intrinsic value for vested’. When interpreting the results, 
one should note that if all the options are fully vested, then paying the intrinsic value for the 
vested options only is essentially the same as paying the intrinsic value for all of the options.  
                                               
9 Denbury Resources acquisition of Encore, Form 8-K filed on 2009-11-03. 
10 Form 8-K filed on 2009-01-29. 
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In Oracle’s acquisition of Sun Microsystems, non-employees were to receive the intrinsic 
value only for the vested part of their options.  
“Company Compensatory  Award that  is  held  by  a  person who is  not  an  employee  of,  or  a  
consultant to, the Company or any Subsidiary of the Company immediately prior to the 
Effective Time (the “Cashed Out Compensatory Awards”) shall not be assumed by Parent 
pursuant to this Section 2.06 and shall, immediately prior to the Effective Time, be cancelled 
and extinguished and the vested portion thereof shall automatically be converted into the 
right to receive an amount in cash equal to the product obtained by multiplying (x) the 
aggregate number of shares of Company Common Stock that were issuable upon exercise or 
settlement of such Cashed Out Compensatory Award immediately prior to the Effective 
Time and (y) the Merger Consideration, less any per share exercise price of such Cashed Out 
Compensatory Award.” 11 
Clinical Data agreed to acquire Avalon Pharmaceuticals and it was agreed that all options of 
Avalon shall be cancelled. 
“At the Effective Time, each Company Option that is outstanding and unexercised 
immediately prior to the Effective Time, whether or not vested, shall be cancelled and shall 
be of no further force and effect. Prior to the Effective Time, the Company shall take all 
actions that may be necessary (under the Option Plans and otherwise) to effectuate the 
provisions of this Section 5.4(a) and to ensure that, from and after the Effective Time, all 
Company Options have been canceled and all holders of Company Options have no rights 
with respect thereto other than those specifically provided in this Section 5.4(a).” 12 
Consideration offered is in most cases a lump sum of money. Other less used alternative is 
that the option holder actually needs to exercise the options to realize the value. In addition, 
there are some cases in which both cash and stock are offered in the same basis than for the 
common stock holders. In these cases the intrinsic value, the offer value over the option 
exercise price, is converted to ‘common stock equivalents’ by dividing the intrinsic value with 
the target share price, and then offering them the same consideration than common stock 
holders are promised.13 Also  in  one  case,  holder  was  able  to  choose  to  receive  the  intrinsic  
                                               
11 Form 8-K filed on 2009-04-20. 
12 Form 8-K filed on 2008-10-30 
13 See for instance Stone Energy’s acquisition of Bois d'Arc Energy, Form 8-K filed on 2008-05-01.  
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value in either cash or in parent common stock.14 Other  alteration  of  the  intrinsic  value  
method is to the payment according to the original vesting schedule of the options and not 
immediately following the transaction. 
In some cases all option holders receive certain minimum value for giving up their options. In 
addition to in-the-money option holders receiving the intrinsic value of the options, out-of-
the-money option holders also receive a small fixed payment. The sample includes only few 
cases like this, and the minimum value is always relatively low. In an acquisition of Lineage 
Power Holdings by Cherokee International, it is stated that “If the exercise price per share of 
any Company Stock Option equals or exceeds the Merger Consideration, the cash amount 
payable therefor shall be $0.01 per share.”.15 
In sum, as the name implies, using intrinsic value method to value options clearly destroys the 
time value of options. Only exception is the minimum value method in which out-of-the-
money option holders receive even a small compensation in lieu of termination of their 
options. Offering intrinsic value for the vested options only obviously further increases the 
value destruction. 
4.1.2 Options converted 
In connection of an acquisition or a merger, it can be agreed that the options are converted to 
the options of the acquirer or the surviving corporation. In some occasions this is referred to 
as ‘assuming options’ and ‘assumed options’, having the same meaning. In these cases, 
material  terms  of  the  option  contracts  remain  the  same,  but  the  underlying  asset  is  not  
anymore the stock of the target. In addition, exercise price and number of options are adjusted 
using the exchange ratio of stock-for-stock deal, or in a cash deal using the exchange ratio 
calculated with the cash consideration and the acquirer share price. 
Bank of America agreed to convert all outstanding options of Merrill Lynch & Co in a merger 
between the two. 
                                               
14 Ares Capital bid for Allied Capita, Form 8-K filed on 2009-10-30. 
15 Form 8-K filed on 2008-09-30. 
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“[Company Options] shall be converted into an option (an “Adjusted Option”) to purchase, 
the number of whole shares of Parent Common Stock that is equal to the number of shares of 
Company Common Stock subject to such Company Option immediately prior to the 
Effective Time multiplied by the Exchange Ratio (rounded down to the nearest whole share), 
at an exercise price per share of Parent Common Stock (rounded up to the nearest whole 
penny) equal to the exercise price for each such share of Company Common Stock subject to 
such Company Option immediately prior to the Effective Time divided by the Exchange 
Ratio, and otherwise on the same terms and conditions (including applicable vesting 
requirements and any accelerated vesting thereof) as applied to each such Company Option 
immediately prior to the Effective Time” 16 
Some agreements specifically state that in addition to converting the options, also the vesting 
is accelerated for all options. However, in many cases accelerated vesting can take place 
although it is not explicitly stated in the transaction agreement if option agreement includes a 
change-in-control provision dictating this. 
Additional restrictions can also be attached to option conversion. I identify individual cases in 
which only in-the-money options are converted, such as Sprint Nextel’s successful acquisition 
of Virgin Mobile USA17, and cases in which options are converted only if strike price is lower 
than certain defined value. In practice the latter case leads to termination of deep out-of-the-
money options, such as in a $20 per share tender offer for CV Therapeutics by Gilead 
Sciences. 
“At the Effective Time, each Company Option that is outstanding and unexercised as of 
immediately prior to the Effective Time, whether or not vested, that has an exercise price per 
share not greater than $41.00 shall be assumed by Parent…”18 
Finally, I identify cases in which the exercise price of converted options cannot be lower than 
the par value of the underlying common stock. For instance, this restriction was included in 
the agreement between Basic Energy Services and Grey Wolf, the latter being the acquirer.19  
                                               
16 Form 8-K filed on 2008-09-18. 
17 Form 8-K filed on 2009-07-28. 
18 Form 8-K filed on 2009-03-18. 
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In sum, converting options retains both intrinsic value and time value of options. However, 
there are individual cases in which certain options, such as out-of-the-money options, are not 
converted but simply terminated with no compensation. In spite of retaining the intrinsic and 
time value of option when converted, this does not indicate that the option value would not 
change. Now the underlying asset is different and the change in the volatility of the 
underlying stock can increase or decrease the option value. 
4.1.3 Other 
A small number of valuation methods exist that do not fit under the intrinsic value or options 
converted categories. Assigning these to category ‘Other’ serves the purpose of not creating 
too complex classification system that would distort the analyses on determinants of option 
valuation methods. However, it is important to make sure that this category includes only 
relatively small amount of observations, as interpreting any results from the analyses 
regarding other methods is not really meaningful.   
As  discussed  earlier,  if  different  valuation  methods  are  applied  to  different  option  plans  or  
different holder groups, more than one valuation method is assigned to that transaction. 
However, if more than one valuation method is applied to same options for same holders, 
such as cases in which in-the-money options are paid intrinsic value and out-of-the-money 
options are converted, then method is classified to be ‘Other’. Majority of transactions in this 
category  are  different  kinds  of  combinations  of  other  methods,  in  which  option  moneyness,  
vesting status of options, or holder decision determines the option valuation method. 
Nevertheless, this category also includes some of the most interesting valuation methods in 
the whole sample. South Korean Arigene Co Ltd offered to pay intrinsic value for the options 
of Trimeris Inc, but also 50% of B-S value for options with non-positive intrinsic value. This 
is the only transaction in the sample with B-S or similar model being used for any purposes 
when valuing options. 
“In connection with this cancellation, the Company will seek a release of claims related to 
the Company Stock Options from each holder; for this release, for any options not 
                                                                                                                                                   
19 Form 8-K filed on 2008-04-22. 
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anticipated to receive payment under Section 2.9(b), the Purchaser or Parent will pay an 
amount as set forth on Section 2.9 of the Company Disclosure Schedule equal to fifty percent 
(50%) of the Black & Scholes value with respect to the remaining life of such option as 
determined using the assumptions currently in use by the Company and the Closing 
Payment.” 20 
Other interesting method is used by TD Ameritrade Inc when acquiring Thinkorswim Group 
Inc. The agreement states that the options of Thinkorswim Group shall be converted to the 
options of the parent, but out-of-the-money option holders will be offered restricted stock 
units (RSUs) in lieu of terminating the options.  
“To the extent permitted by applicable Law and Governmental Authorities, the Company 
shall make an offer to all holders of Underwater Options outstanding under the Company 
Option Plans immediately prior to the Effective Time, pursuant to which the holder 
affirmatively would agree in writing to the cancellation of all (but not less than all) of his or 
her  Underwater  Options  in  exchange  for  the  grant  by  the  Company  to  such  holder  of  an  
award of restricted stock units (the "Option Exchange Program"). The Company and the 
Parent shall work together in good faith to determine the terms and conditions of both the 
Option Exchange Program and the restricted stock units to be granted thereunder…”21 
Although the option exchange offer was still pending on the shareholder approval, the exact 
terms were disclosed and nearly all eligible option holders participated in the offer. In the 
same filing Thinkorswim Group also talks about the reasoning behind the exchange offer. 
“We believe that these underwater options may have little value as either an incentive or 
retention tool. The exchange offer is intended to re-incentivize the eligible individuals who 
participate in the exchange program…”22 
Last case discussed in this category is a bid by Ligand Pharmaceuticals for Pharmacopeia. In 
an agreement between the two, it is said that company will offer to cancel any options for an 
undetermined cash consideration. If option holders do not participate to cancellation offer, 
options under certain plans will be converted and other options will be paid intrinsic value. 
                                               
20 Form 8-K filed on 2009-10-05. 
21 Form 8-K filed on 2009-01-12. 
22 Form SC TO-I filed on 2009-04-17. 
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“Prior to the Merger 1 Effective Time, the Company shall offer to cancel, effective 
immediately prior to the Merger 1 Effective Time, any of the Company Options granted 
under the Company Stock Plans (a “Cancellation Offer”) in exchange for the payment of an 
amount to be determined by the Company up to $0.20 per share of Company Common Stock 
subject to such Company Options (each such payment, an “Option Cancellation Payment”); 
provided, however, that in no event shall the Option Cancellation Payments exceed 
$1,000,000 in the aggregate.”23 
In  sum,  these  individual  cases  show  that  although  in  most  cases  options  are  either  paid  
intrinsic value or converted to new options, many other methods exist as well. Wording in 
these agreements, such as “Company shall offer to cancel…”  and  “Company will seek a 
release of claims...”, also indicate that the valuation is not dictated by the option plan 
agreements or individual contracts. From the valuation point of view it is hard to make any 
clear conclusions as methods in this category are so diverse.  
4.1.4 Not available 
Information on stock option valuation is not available for all the transactions in the sample. 
There are two major groups of cases that fall into this category. First, acquiring company can 
only have issued a non-binding indication of interest to the acquirer, such as letter of intent. 
Even though this is usually filed with SEC and hence the content is available to the public, 
most of the time it only states the most important terms such as the offer price. Database for 
the transactions treats these cases as any other transactions, and therefore it is impossible to 
determine in advance whether the information is actually available or not. Including only 
completed deals would decrease the number of cases without the information to almost zero, 
but could cause other biases as discussed earlier. Example of transaction where option 
valuation method is not disclosed is Microsoft’s attempt to buy Yahoo!, at which Microsoft 
only issued a proposal without ever proceeding with a formal offer after the board of Yahoo! 
rejected the proposed bid. 24 
                                               
23 Form 8-K filed on 2008-09-25. 
24 Form 8-K filed on 2008-02-01. 
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Second, quite often the valuation method is not disclosed in tender offer statements. However, 
if the transaction succeeds or at least both parties agree on it, a definitive mutually negotiated 
agreement is usually disclosed that contains the option valuation information. Hence, many of 
the transactions in this category are unsuccessful tender offers. 
In  addition  to  these  two  types  of  transactions,  there  are  some  cases  in  which  a  deal  is  
completed and target has options, but valuation method is still not disclosed. In many cases it 
is stated that the buyer will honor all contracts and agreements, probably meaning that the 
valuation method is determined solely based on the option contracts. As the investigation of 
the actual option plans agreements is out of the scope of this study, these cases are also 
classified as information not being available. 
In sum, information on option valuation in mergers and acquisitions is quite well disclosed. 
However, method is often not disclosed if no formal offer is made or no mutual agreement is 
disclosed following tender offer. Also, companies may simply make a reference to option 
plans or agreements when stating how options are treated without explicitly stating the 
method. 
4.2 Use of identified methods and effect on time value of options 
Summary of option valuation methods is shown in Table IV. Number of transactions is 381 
and due to the possibility of multiple observations per transaction, number of observations 
exceeds the number of transactions and equals to 399 including the observations with no 
information available. 
In total, 316 observations of disclosed valuation methods are found from 298 different 
transactions. There are 83 transactions in which information is not disclosed, corresponding to 
21% out of the whole sample. Only eight out of the 83 transactions with no information on 
option valuation method are completed while the rest are either withdrawn or pending. As 
discussed earlier, transactions with no information available are by and large cases in which 
no formal offer is made that would outline the details of the transaction. Therefore, these 
transactions do not offer us much of an insight regarding the option valuation methods, and 
hence the transactions with no information available are excluded from the forthcoming 
analyses. 
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Table IV 
ESO valuation methods in mergers and acquisitions 
Table summarizes employee stock option valuation methods in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009. Sample 
consists of events in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Final sample of 381 transactions is 
constructed by excluding repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and 
transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, and no target options. Valuation methods are classified 
according to information found from the disclosures filed with Securities and Exchange Commission. Number of 
observations exceeds number of transactions as in some cases different options of the company are valued in different ways. 
Intrinsic value refers to method in which option holder essentially receives a value equal to offer price over the strike price 
of the option. Options converted refers to method in which options are converted to new options of acquirer or surviving 
entity with essentially the same terms and conditions. Intrinsic or converted refers to method in which holder can choose 
between the two above mentioned methods. Miscellaneous refers to methods not assigned to any other category. 
  No. of 
observations 
% of total % of total 
method disc. 
Intrinsic value (Time value lost) 210 53 % 66 % 
 All options paid intrinsic value 186 47 % 59 % 
 Vested options paid intrinsic value 19 5 % 6 % 
 Options paid intrinsic value according to 
original vesting schedule 
3 1 % 1 % 
 Options paid intrinsic with minimum value 2 1 % 1 % 
     
Options converted (Time value retained) 96 24 % 30 % 
 All options converted 75 19 % 24 % 
 All options converted with acc. vesting 16 4 % 5 % 
 Options converted with restrictions 5 1 % 2 % 
     
Other 10 3% 3% 
 Intrinsic or converted 3 1 % 1 % 
 Miscellaneous 7 2 % 2 % 
     
Not available 83 21 %     
     
Total 399   
Total, method disclosed 316   
Transactions 381   
Transactions, method disclosed 298     
 
Table IV shows that on average, option holders are most likely to receive intrinsic value for 
all of the options despite the vesting status. Intrinsic value for all options is paid in 59% of 
cases or 186 times out of the 316 observations in which the method is disclosed. As shown in 
the table, other variants of intrinsic value are significantly less used in practice. In 19 cases 
only vested options are cashed out, whereas only in three cases intrinsic value is paid for all 
the options following the original vesting schedule. In two cases a certain minimum value is 
paid if intrinsic value does not exceed it. When considering all the cases in which intrinsic 
value is paid with some additional characteristics or not, there are 67% or 211 cases like that 
in the sample. This category of observations is further classified as ‘Time value lost’ as option 
valuation is based on the intrinsic value of options only. 
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Second largest group are the transactions in which options are converted to the acquirer 
options or to the options of the surviving corporation. In 75 (24%) cases options are converted 
and in 16 (5%) cases options are converted and simultaneously vesting of all options is 
accelerated. In addition, there are two cases in which only in-the-money options are converted 
and out-of-the-money options are terminated. In three transactions options are converted only 
if the strike price of the option is below certain level. As a group, cases in which options are 
converted add up to 96 cases representing 30% of all transactions in which the valuation 
method is disclosed. This category of observations is further classified as ‘Time value 
retained’ as converted options retain both intrinsic and time value of options. 
In addition, there are three cases in which holder can choose between receiving the intrinsic 
value and converted options. Also, there are seven cases in which valuation method is none of 
the ones mentioned previously. The group mainly includes cases in which the valuation 
method consists of elements from other methods, but also more unorthodox cases such as 
paying 50% of B-S value for options with non-positive intrinsic value are present. Although 
interesting as such, these cases are unlikely to have any material effect on the analysis due to 
very low number of observations. 
Finally, there are 18 transactions in which more than one option valuation method is applied 
for different option plans or different option holder groups, such as for the management team 
and the other employees. These are not shown as a separate group in the table, but both 
valuation methods are assigned to their appropriate categories as individual observations. In 
all cases both intrinsic value and option conversion methods are used, of which in four cases 
intrinsic value is paid for vested options only. 
In sum, two main categories of valuation methods clearly emerge. First, in intrinsic value 
method option  holders  are  paid  only  the  intrinsic  value  of  options  causing  them to  lose  the  
time value of options. The most common method in this category is to offer the intrinsic value 
for  all  options  despite  their  vesting  status.  Second,  in  options  converted  method options  are  
converted to new options of the acquirer or the surviving corporation, and therefore the time 
value of options is retained. The most common method in this category is to convert all 
outstanding options of the target. These two categories of valuation methods, ‘Intrinsic value’ 
and ‘Options converted’, are used in the following analysis to study what determines the 
valuation method used and consequently whether the time value is lost or not. 
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5. Determinants of ESO valuation methods 
This section investigates the determinants of ESO valuation methods in mergers and 
acquisitions, and consequently either losing or retaining the time value of options. First, 
investigated determinants and related univariate evidence are presented. Second, multivariate 
analysis is conducted by estimating various logistic regression models. All analyses are 
conducted using statistical software package Stata 11. 
Table V 
Filtering of sample for the analysis of valuation method determinants 
Table shows the filtering of option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions used in the analysis of valuation 
method determinants. Valuation methods are classified according to information found from the disclosures filed with 
SEC. Number of observations exceeds number of transactions as in some cases different options of the company are valued 
in different ways. Intrinsic value refers to method in which option holder essentially receives a value equal to offer price 
over the strike price of the option. Options converted refers to method in which options are converted to new options of 
acquirer or surviving entity with essentially the same terms and conditions. Intrinsic or converted refers  to  method  in  
which holder can choose between the two above mentioned methods. Miscellaneous refers to methods not assigned to any 
other category. 
Sample for which option valuation data collected  381 
Option valuation method not available  -83 
Sample of transactions, method disclosed  298 
Two option valuation methods in one transaction + 18 
Sample of option valuation method observations  316 
Valuation method classified as Other – 7 
Valuation method classified as Intrinsic or converted – 3 
Sample for analysis of valuation method determinants  306 
 
Sample for the analysis of valuation method determinants consists of all option valuation 
method observations classified in the ‘Intrinsic value’ or ‘Options converted’ categories, and 
therefore  ten  observations  classified  as  ‘Other’  are  excluded  from  the  analysis.  Table  V  
summarizes the filtering of the sample for the analysis of valuation method determinants. 
5.1 Investigated determinants and univariate evidence 
Purpose  of  this  section  is  to  justify  why  each  of  the  determinants  discussed  could  have  an  
effect on option valuation method and subsequently on either losing or retaining time value in 
corporate transactions. In addition, univariate analysis of each of the determinants is 
conducted against the option valuation method category. 
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Previous literature offers very limited help in defining the possible causes of option valuation 
method in transactions, and hence the determinants to be tested are to large extent based on 
other related studies and common sense. Investigated determinants are all either continuous 
variables, or variables coded as dichotomous for the purposes of the regression analysis in the 
next  section.  Univariate  analysis  is  conducted  by  using  Pearson  Chi-square  test  for  the  
association between the dichotomous variables and the option valuation method. For 
continuous variables two-tail t-test is used to investigate the differences in the means and 
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test to examine the differences in the medians. 
5.1.1 Transaction characteristics 
A. Form of Transaction 
In general, tender offers and negotiated mergers are both means of conducting a takeover 
offer. However, in tender offer, the offer is made directly to the shareholders of the target, 
whereas in merger the acquirer negotiates with the management (see for instance Martin, 
1996). Even in tender offers it is still common that the acquirer asks target management for 
their approval (Weston et al., 2004). 
Ferenczy (2008) suggests that the form of transaction can affect whether option holders 
receive the intrinsic value or new options in the surviving corporation. Author makes a 
distinction between acquisitions and mergers, and notes that in acquisitions option holders are 
likely to receive intrinsic value and in mergers new options of the surviving corporation. 
I  use  dummy  variable  that  assumes  value  of  one  if  tender  offer  is  conducted  and  zero  
otherwise  (all  other  cases  are  classified  as  mergers).  Table  VII  shows  that  in  22.9%  of  the  
valuation method observations transaction is made via tender offer. However, in the intrinsic 
value subsample the figure is 27.6% compared to 12.5% in the options converted subsample, 
indicating a strong relation between the form of transaction and the ESO valuation method. 
The relation is also statistically significant with p-value of 0.003. 
B. Method of payment 
Method of payment is studied to be closely related with the form of transaction. Martin (1996) 
finds out that tender offers tend to be cash financed, and concludes that one important reason 
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is that cash deals are faster to consummate than mergers as stock deals must be made in 
accordance with the Securities Act of 1933. Fishman (1989) proposes that acquirers are more 
likely to use cash instead of stock to preempt competition when competing bidders exist. 
Nonetheless, as shown in the study by Martin (1996), form of transaction does not directly 
dictate the method of payment. In my data both tender offers and mergers are present in cash 
deals, but the proportion of tender offers is significantly higher in a subsample of cash deals 
(30.6%) compared to proportion in the total sample (22.3%). In contrast, the deals in which 
the method of payment includes stock, tender offer is made in only 8% of transactions. Hence 
the method of payment and form of transaction are not complete substitutes with each other 
and both variables need to be controlled in multivariate analysis. 
In addition to the form of transaction, many other determinants are shown to affect the choice 
of method of payment. For instance, Martin (1996) shows that acquiring firms with lower 
cash balances relative to the price of the acquisition tend to use stock financing, and among 
others Travlos (1987) reports that using stock to finance a takeover conveys the negative 
information that the bidding firm is overvalued. Instead of controlling for the various 
individual variables affecting the method of payment, I only include dummy variables that 
indicate the realized method of payment. Table VIII shows the statistics for dummy variables 
for cash and stock that assume value of one if the corresponding consideration is part of the 
method of payment. 
Going forward, given that the options are equity instruments I hypothesize that if the acquirer 
decides  to  use  own  stock  instead  or  in  addition  to  cash,  options  are  more  likely  to  be  
converted than paid the intrinsic value. Similarly, in its opinion the Delaware Court of 
Chancery outlines a ‘general  rule’ stating that the value of a derivative instrument is  tied to 
the  value  of  the  security  into  which  it  is  exercisable. 25  Therefore  in  cash  deals  the  option  
holders can be paid the intrinsic value of options, whereas in the stock deals option holders 
expect to have their old options replaced with new options as the underlying stock is replaced 
with new underlying stock. 
                                               
25 Lillis v. A T & T Corp., 2007 WL 2110587 (Del. Ch., July 20, 2007) 
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Based on Table VI, cash only deals are prevailing in the Intrinsic value subsample 
representing 72.9% of the observations, compared to 57.8% in the whole sample. In contrast, 
only 25.0% of observations in Options converted sample are paid in cash only. The 
proportions in the subsample are the opposite when examining the share of stock deals. When 
options are converted, in 34.4% of the cases only stock is used, compared to mere 4.3% when 
intrinsic value is paid. Combination of cash and stock is used in 35.4% of the observations 
when options are converted and in 8.6% when intrinsic value is paid. 
Table VI 
Method of payment in ESO valuation method subsamples 
Table shows the method of payment delineated by ESO valuation method used. Intrinsic value refers to option valuation 
method in which option holder essentially receives a value equal to offer price over the strike price of the option. Options 
converted refers to method in which options are converted to new options of acquirer or surviving entity with essentially the 
same terms and conditions. Observations not classified into these categories are omitted (10 observations). Valuation 
methods are classified according to information found from the disclosures filed with Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target 
company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, 
intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, option valuation 
method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. All data from SDC 
Platinum database unless otherwise stated. 
  Options converted   Intrinsic value   All observations 
 
N Percent  N Percent  N Percent 
Cash Only 24 25.0 % 
 
153 72.9 % 
 
177 57.8 % 
Stock Only 33 34.4 % 
 
9 4.3 % 
 
42 13.7 % 
Cash and Stock 34 35.4 % 
 
30 14.3 % 
 
64 20.9 % 
Other 5 5.2 % 
 
18 8.6 % 
 
23 7.5 % 
Total 96 100.0 %   210 100.0 %   306 100.0 % 
 
To test the statistical significance of the association between the method of payment and the 
option valuation method, I construct two dichotomous variables representing whether the 
method of payment includes cash and stock. Therefore the proportion of cash dummy variable 
for instance is equal to the share of ‘Cash Only’ and ‘Cash and Stock’ observations in Table 
VI. Results are shown in Table VII. For both cash and stock dummy variables the association 
with the ESO valuation method is statistically significant with p-value of 0.000. 
In sum, based on the univariate evidence the method of payment has a large influence on the 
option valuation method and losing or retaining the time value of options. Especially in the 
Intrinsic value subsample the method of payment usually includes cash (87%), but in the 
Options converted subsample the situation is less straightforward. 
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Table VII 
Univariate evidence of transaction characteristics in ESO valuation method subsamples 
Table shows univariate evidence of transaction related valuation method determinants. Intrinsic value refers to option valuation method in which option holder essentially receives a value 
equal to offer price over the strike price of the option. Options converted refers to method in which options are converted to new options of acquirer or surviving entity with essentially the 
same terms and conditions. Observations not classified into these categories are omitted (10 observations). Valuation methods are classified according to information found from the 
disclosures filed with Securities and Exchange Commission. Dichotomous variables are coded as follows. Year 2009, equal to one if transaction announced on 2009; Stock, equal to one if 
stock is used as method of payment; Cash, equal to one if cash is used as method of payment; Tender offer, equal to one if tender offer is being made; Completed, equal to one if transaction is 
(partially) completed. Log of Transaction Value is the logarithm of the total value of consideration offered. Test statistics related to reported p-values; (a) Pearson Ȥ2 (1df) test for 
independence of categories, (b) two tailed t-test for difference in means, (c) Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test for difference in medians. Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in 
mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, 
intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or 
retain the time value of options. All data from SDC Platinum database unless otherwise stated. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
  
All observations   Options converted  
(Time value retained)   
Intrinsic value  
(Time value lost)   
Difference  p-value 
N 306  96  210     
Year (dummy) 0.438  0.469  0.424  0.045  0.462a 
Stock (dummy) 0.346  0.698  0.186  0.512  0.000a*** 
Cash (dummy) 0.788  0.604  0.871  -0.267  0.000a*** 
Tender Offer (dummy) 0.229  0.125  0.276  -0.151  0.003a*** 
Completed (dummy) 0.755  0.729  0.767  -0.038  0.479a 
Log of Transaction Value          
   Mean 2.430  2.711  2.302  0.410  0.001b*** 
   Median 2.360  2.675  2.270  0.405  0.001c*** 
   Standard deviation 0.879   0.917   0.832       
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C. Transaction value  
I hypothesize the transaction value to increase the probability of converting options due to 
several possible reasons. First, the cash needed to pay the intrinsic value of options is likely to 
be significantly higher in transactions with high transaction value. Although this may not hold 
in relative terms compared to the transaction value, the higher absolute value of cash needed 
to compensate for the options can make acquirer to prefer converting options. For instance, 
Murphy (1999) shows that that the CEO compensation is higher in larger companies, and also 
the share of options out of the total compensation is higher. Second, in a large transaction the 
acquirer is can seeking to retain a significant number of target employees. If all options 
become fully vested and are paid the intrinsic value, a significant amount of new incentive 
instruments such as options need to be issued in addition to paying the intrinsic value. 
Table VII shows that the median transaction value in options converted subsample is $473 
million (logarithmic value of 2.675) compared to $186 million (logarithmic value of 2.270) in 
the intrinsic value subsample. Statistical tests for the differences in mean and median are 
statistically significant with p-values of 0.001, and hence the univariate evidence supports the 
hypothesis of larger transactions being related with converting options in transactions. 
D. Announcement year and completion status 
Transaction completion status and the year of announcement are tested mainly for the control 
purposes. However, I hypothesize that if the option holders who participate in the merger 
negotiations, such as the executive team or the board of directors, prefer in general either of 
the valuation methods over the other, then the valuation method can be associated with 
transaction completion status. 
As shown in Table VII, proportions of dummy variables indicating whether the transaction is 
announced in 2009 and whether it is completed or not are both roughly equally presented in 
the options converted and intrinsic value subsamples. In addition, tested associations are also 
statistically insignificant indicating no association between the valuation methods and 
transaction completion status or the announcement year. 
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5.1.2 Acquirer characteristics 
A. Acquirer public status 
Perhaps one of the most obvious determinants for the option valuation method is whether 
acquirer is publicly listed or not. Private acquirer is very unlikely to convert options as it does 
not have a quoted market price for its shares and therefore apparent issues related to valuing 
options arise. Table VIII shows that the acquirer is publicly listed in 94.8% of the cases in 
which the options are converted compared to 56.7% when the intrinsic value is paid. The 
relation between the public status and the valuation method is highly statistically significant 
with p-value of 0.000 and therefore strongly supports the hypothesis of acquirer being 
publicly listed affecting the option valuation method. 
B. Acquirer nation 
I hypothesize two possible explanations why US acquirers are more likely to convert options, 
and foreign acquirers more likely to pay the intrinsic value and terminate the options. First, 
non-US companies not converting options could be related to the differences in legislation 
and rules of exchanges for instance, as the requirements for the option plans can vary. In 
addition, in non-US countries a shareholder vote can be required to issue new equity awards 
even in conjunction with a merger or an acquisition. Therefore, it is likely to be more 
convenient for foreign buyers to simply pay the intrinsic value for options and terminate the 
plans if possible. Second hypothesized explanation is that as the US companies are ranked 
highest in the international comparison of granting ESOs (Murphy, 1999), it is more likely 
with foreign buyers that other types of compensation instruments are in use instead of the 
options. 
Table VIII shows that the proportion of US buyers is higher when the options are converted 
(94.8%) compared to the cases in which the intrinsic value is paid (87.6%). The association 
between the acquirer nation and the valuation method is statistically significant with p-value 
of 0.054. Although in the whole sample there are relatively few cases with foreign buyer, the 
evidence suggests that US (foreign) acquirers are more (less) likely to convert options than to 
pay the intrinsic value. Given that the first explanation of different legislation holds, we 
would anticipate to make similar observations with the data from other countries as well.
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Table VIII 
Univariate evidence of acquirer and target characteristics in ESO valuation method subsamples 
Table shows univariate evidence of acquirer and target related valuation method determinants. Intrinsic value refers to option valuation method in which option holder essentially receives a 
value equal to offer price over the strike price of the option. Options converted refers to method in which options are converted to new options of acquirer or surviving entity with essentially 
the same terms and conditions. Observations not classified into these categories are omitted (10 observations). Valuation methods are classified according to information found from the 
disclosures filed with Securities and Exchange Commission. Dichotomous variables: Public Acquirer, equal to one if acquirer is publicly listed; US Acquirer, equal to one if acquirer nation is 
US. NYSE, equal to one if target listed on NYSE. Continuous variables: Remaining Life is the option amount weighted average contractual time to expiration, collected from most recent annual 
or quarterly report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to the announcement of transaction. Option moneyness is defined as max[(offer value - average strike 
price)/average strike price, 0]. Test statistics related to reported p-values; (a) Pearson Ȥ2 (1df) test for independence of categories, (b) two tailed t-test for difference in means, (c) Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test for difference in medians. Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on 
either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no 
target options, option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. All data from SDC Platinum database unless otherwise 
stated. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
All observations  Options converted 
(Time value retained)  
Intrinsic value 
(Time value lost)  
Difference  p-value 
Public Acquirer (dummy) 0.686  0.948  0.567  0.381  0.000a*** 
US Acquirer (dummy) 0.899  0.948  0.876  0.072  0.054a* 
NYSE (dummy) 0.232  0.375  0.167  0.208  0.000a*** 
   N 306  96  210     
Option Remaining Life (N) 296  89  206     
   Mean 5.706  5.660  5.726  -0.067  0.764b 
   Median 5.800  5.600  5.800  -0.200  0.651c 
   Standard deviation 1.750  1.832  1.717  0.116   
Option Moneyness (N) 228  76  152     
   Mean 0.947  0.803  1.019  -0.216  0.399b 
   Median 0.400  0.300  0.500  -0.200  0.135c 
   Standard deviation 1.823  1.329  2.025  -0.696   
Options Out-of-the-money (dummy) 0.237  0.289  0.211  0.079  0.186a 
   N 228  76  152     
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5.1.3 Target characteristics 
A. Target Exchange 
Frederic W. Cook & Co. (2005) show in their report that NYSE companies have less change-
in-control provisions in option plans and agreements compared to Nasdaq companies that 
should lead to greater latitude in deciding the option valuation method. Although the 
anticipated effect of having more latitude is somewhat vague, I hypothesize that options of 
NYSE companies are less often paid intrinsic value compared to Nasdaq companies. 
Rationale  is  that  as  most  of  the  change-in-control  provisions,  less  prevalent  among  NYSE  
companies, provide the accelerated vesting, acquirer does not bother to convert options as big 
portion of those are likely to be exercised immediately. Therefore when the target is listed on 
NYSE, the acquirer more often has a real alternative to convert options to facilitate the 
retention of employees, and perhaps spare some cash as well. 
Table VIII shows that the exchange of the target and the option valuation method are related 
and that the association is statistically significant with p-value of 0.000. Proportion of cases in 
which the target is quoted on NYSE (Nasdaq) is significantly higher (lower) when options are 
converted than when intrinsic value is paid. Overall, target is listed on NYSE in only 23.2% 
of the cases and in Nasdaq in 76.8% of the cases, whereas in the options converted sample the 
corresponding proportions are 37.5% and 62.5%. Therefore the univariate evidence supports 
the  hypothesis  of  the  effect  of  the  exchange,  although  it  can  be  that  being  listed  on  NYSE  
only acts as a proxy for the higher transaction value (or vice versa) which was shown to be 
associated with converting options as well. 
B. Option moneyness 
Other things equal, when option gets more in-the-money, option delta will decrease and the 
intrinsic value will converge towards the option value. Therefore, the deeper in-the-money the 
options are, the less value is sacrificed when paying only the intrinsic value compared to 
converting options. In addition, holders of in-the-money options are likely to prefer receiving 
intrinsic value over converted options, especially compared to the holders of out-of-the-
money options who would receive nothing. Therefore I anticipate the moneyness to be higher 
in the intrinsic value subsample compared to option converted cases. 
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I define the variable for the option moneyness as    
»¼
º
«¬
ª  0,max
priceStrike
priceStrikevalueOfferMoneyness  (1) 
where the offer value refers to the final offer value per common share in monetary terms and 
the strike price refers to average strike price for options outstanding. Approach loosely 
follows Carter and Lynch (2001) who calculate a measure for option being out-of-the-money. 
Moneyness indicates how many fold the intrinsic value is compared to strike price, and 
therefore in-the-money options assume values greater than zero. As there is no information 
available for out-of-the-money options, moneyness variable always assumes value of zero if 
all options are out-of-the-money. All data are retrieved from SDC database, and it is available 
for only 228 observations. In 174 (76%) cases options are in-the-money, and in 54 (24%) 
cases all options are out-of-the-money. 
 
Panel A: Options converted Panel B: Intrinsic value 
  
Figure II: Distribution of target option moneyness in valuation method subsamples 
Figures show the frequency distributions for target stock options moneyness defined as max[(offer value - average strike 
price)/average strike price, 0]. Bar to the left from zero shows the portion of out-of-the-money options. Histograms present 143 
(Options converted) and 70 (Intrinsic value) observations, 15 extreme values omitted from the graphs. Intrinsic value refers to 
option valuation method in which option holder essentially receives a value equal to offer price over the strike price of the 
option. Options converted refers to method in which options are converted to new options of acquirer or surviving entity with 
essentially the same terms and conditions. Observations not classified into these categories are omitted (10 observations). 
Valuation methods are classified according to information found from the disclosures filed with SEC, all other data from SDC 
Platinum database. Sample consists of option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in 
which  target  company  is  listed  on  either  Nasdaq  or  NYSE.  Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) 
restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, option 
valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. 
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Table VIII shows that the mean and median moneyness values are higher in the intrinsic value 
subsample, but the p-values of the test statistics are not statistically significant. Looking at the 
histograms in Figure II, it is evident that the moneyness variable is heavily skewed to the left 
and it is hence far from being normally distributed. Therefore the non-parametric Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test with p-value of 0.135, yet still considered to be statistically 
insignificant, is more appropriate compared to the t-test that results to considerably higher p-
value of 0.399. In addition, I further test the effect of the option moneyness by investigating 
the proportions of the out-of-the-money options in the subsamples. When options are 
converted, approximately 29% of options are out-of-the-money, and when the intrinsic value 
is paid the corresponding value is 21%. However, the association is not statistically 
significant (p-value of 0.186) and therefore the univariate evidence offers little support for the 
hypothesis of target option moneyness affecting the option valuation method. 
C. Remaining life of options 
I hypothesize that if the remaining life of outstanding options is high, more time value would 
be lost if only intrinsic value had been paid and therefore options would be converted to retain 
the time value. This would specifically apply if acquirer wants to retain the incentive effect of 
options to keep option holders working for the company. In addition, executives of target 
company may respond to the proposed deal more favorably if their newly issued options with 
long maturity are converted rather than terminated. As the variable describes the weighted 
average remaining life of all options outstanding for a particular company, there is likely to be 
less extreme observations than there would be if investigating the same measure for individual 
option plans or option holdings by individuals. 
Student’s t-test test for mean is conducted to compare differences in the remaining life in 
intrinsic value and option conversion samples. Surprisingly, Table VIII shows that on average 
the maturities are longer when intrinsic value is paid compared to cases in which options are 
converted. However, differences in mean and median are statistically insignificant with p-
value of 0.764 and 0.651 respectively. 
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Panel A: Options converted Panel B: Intrinsic value 
  
Figure III: Distribution of remaining life of target options in valuation method subsamples 
Figures show the frequency distributions for remaining life of target stock options collected from SEC filings. Remaining Life
is the option amount weighted average contractual time to expiration and Expected Life is the estimate used in option fair value 
calculations for the most recent period prior the transaction announcement. Histograms present 206 (Options converted) and 89
(Intrinsic value) observations. Excluded are rumored deals, stake purchases, repurchases, debt restructuring and bankruptcy 
cases, and transactions in which target does not have options or option valuation method is not disclosed. Intrinsic value refers 
to option valuation method in which option holder essentially receives a value equal to offer price over the strike price of the 
option. Options converted refers to method in which options are converted to new options of acquirer or surviving entity with 
essentially the same terms and conditions. Observations not classified into these categories are omitted (10 observations). 
Valuation methods are classified according to information found from the disclosures filed with SEC, all other data from SDC 
Platinum database. Sample consists of option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in 
which  target  company  is  listed  on  either  Nasdaq  or  NYSE.  Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) 
restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, option 
valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. 
5.2 Logistic regression of valuation determinants 
The results from the univariate analysis are further tested in a multivariate analysis conducted 
by estimating logistic regression models. First, logistic models in general are briefly 
discussed, followed by the model specifications used in this study. Second, the results of the 
regressions are presented, interpreted, and discussed. 
5.2.1 Model specification 
Logistic regressions are used to investigate determinants of ESOs losing time value in 
mergers and acquisitions. The same sample of option valuation method observations is used 
as previously in the univariate analysis. The sample includes all observations in which options 
are classified to either lose or retain the time value. 
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Logistic regression (often referred to as Logit regression) is used when the dependent variable 
is dichotomous. In logistic regression, data is fitted to a logistic curve and the best fit is found 
by using iterative maximum likelihood estimation. Logistic models are commonly used in 
finance domain to analyze certain events or survey results, such as Brenner et al. (2000), and 
Carter and Lynch (2001) who use logistic regression to investigate determinants of ESO 
reprising events. 
Logistic model is of form 
kk XXp
p EED  ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
 ...1log 11  (2) 
where p is the probability that the dependent variable Y=1 and X1, …, Xk are the independent 
variables. ȕ1, …, ȕk are the regression coefficients that are estimated from the data. 
Table IX 
Description of logistic regression variables 
Table presents variables used in different logistic regression specifications. Panel A describes dependent variable whereas 
Panel B presents independent variables. All data from SDC Platinum database unless otherwise stated. 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
Time Value 
Retained 
= Dependent variable is a dummy that is equal one if options retain time value in 
transaction, zero if time value is lost. Information is collected from the SEC filings. 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Year = Dummy control variable that is equal to one if transaction is announced in 2009 and 
zero if transaction is announced in 2008. 
NYSE = Dummy variable that is equal to one if target is listed on New York Stock Exchange 
and zero if company is Nasdaq listed. 
Stock = Dummy variable equal to one if method of payment involves stock. 
Cash = Dummy variable equal to one if method of payment involves cash. 
Tender Offer = Dummy variable equal to one if tender offer is being made. 
Log Value = Logarithm of transaction value in millions of US dollars. 
Public Acquirer = Dummy variable equal to one if acquirer is publicly listed. 
US Acquirer = Dummy variable equal to one if acquirer’s nation is US. 
Remaining Life = Weighted average remaining life of options outstanding in years. Information is 
collected from the SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings disclosed prior the transaction. 
Completed = Dummy variable equal to one if transaction is completed or partially completed. 
Moneyness = Variable indicates the average relative moneyness of outstanding options, 
calculated as max[(offer value – strike price) / strike price, 0]. 
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Table IX describes both the independent and dependent variables included in the alternative 
model specifications. Same dummy dependent variable, indicating whether the time value is 
retained, is used in all model specifications. This dummy variable assumes value of one if 
options retain time value in transaction, and zero otherwise. To recap, time value retained 
dummy is equal to one if options are converted to new options of acquirer or surviving entity, 
and equal to zero if option holders receive only the intrinsic value for their options. 
Independent  variables  and  the  rationale  for  their  inclusion  are  discussed  in  the  previous  
section.  
Variable correlations are presented in Table X for all independent variables as well as the 
dependent variable. Looking at the dependent variable, a statistically significant correlation is 
reported with all the variables that were deemed to be associated with the valuation method in 
the univariate analysis. Conducting a tender offer and using cash as a method of payment are 
negatively correlated with retaining the time value, whereas a positive and statistically 
significant correlation is shown for using stock, acquirer being public or from the US, target 
being listed on NYSE, and the log of transaction value. 
In addition, many other variables have relatively high and statistically significant correlations, 
indicating possible problems with multicollinearity. Although multicollinearity does not 
weaken the explanatory power of the model as a whole, it can lead to inflated standard errors 
with individual independent variables. This is taken into account by examining various model 
specifications especially with highly correlated variables, and investigating the set of 
independent variables that yields the best results. 
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Table X 
Variable correlations 
Table presents correlation matrix for all investigated variables. Ten observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options in transaction are omitted. Number of 
observations is 306 for all variables except Remaining Life (n=295) and Moneyness (n=228). Time Value Retained dummy is equal to one if option valuation method retains the time 
value of option; Year dummy is equal to one if transaction announced in 2009 and zero if in 2008; NYSE dummy is equal to one if target is listed on NYSE, zero if on Nasdaq; Stock 
dummy is equal to one if stock is used as method of payment; Cash dummy is equal to one if cash is used as method of payment; Tender Offer dummy is equal to one if tender offer 
is being made; Log Value is log of transaction value; Public Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer is public; US Acquirer dummy is equal to one if  acquirer nation is  US; 
Remaining Life is weighted average of remaining life of target options outstanding; Completed dummy is equal to one if transaction is (partially) completed; Moneyness is a measure 
of option moneyness defined as max[(offer value - strike price)/strike price, 0]. Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 
2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and 
transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time 
value of options. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Time Value 
Retained 
Tender 
Offer Stock Cash Log Value Year Completed 
Public 
Acquirer US Acquirer NYSE Moneyness 
Remaining 
Life 
Time Value Retained 1 
Tender Offer -0.17*** 1 
Stock 0.50*** -0.23*** 1 
Cash -0.30*** 0.17*** -0.31*** 1 
Log Value 0.22*** 0.08 0.14*** 0.13** 1 
Year 0.04 0.01 0.13** -0.03 -0.07 1 
Completed -0.04 0.21*** 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.21*** 1 
Public Acquirer 0.38*** 0.07 0.48*** -0.19*** 0.28*** 0.01 0.09* 1 
US Acquirer 0.11* -0.01 0.09* -0.08 -0.18*** 0.08 -0.07 -0.13** 1 
NYSE 0.23*** -0.12** 0.25*** -0.10** 0.55*** -0.02 -0.07 0.15*** -0.07 1 
Moneyness -0.06 0.16*** 0.05 0.12** 0.12** 0.08 -0.10* 0.12** -0.03 0.01 1 
Remaining Life -0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.12** -0.07 -0.11* 0.16*** 0.08 -0.08 -0.12** 0.03 1 
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5.2.2 Stepwise regression  
I start specifying the model using a stepwise regression with backward elimination approach. 
In backward elimination, all candidate explanatory variables are initially included in the 
model and then the statistical significance of each variable is tested. The variables deemed as 
not statistically significant are deleted. Equation for the initial model is 
Time Value Retained i = (3) 
 Įi + ȕ1 Yeari + ȕ2 NYSEi +  ȕ3 Stocki + ȕ4 Cashi  
+ ȕ5 Tender Offeri + ȕ6 Log Valuei + ȕ7 Public Acquireri  
+ ȕ8 US Acquireri + ȕ9 Remaining Lifei   
+ ȕ10Completedi  + İi 
 
As a decision rule in backward elimination approach, variable with the highest test statistic 
value is removed from the model and the regression is run again. Procedure is finished when 
no more variables can be removed based on the decision rule (see for instance Christensen, 
1997). According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), traditional approach to statistical model 
building involves seeking the most parsimonious model that still explains the data. By 
minimizing the number of variables in the model, it is more likely to be numerically stable 
and be more easily generalized. In addition, estimated standard errors become lower and the 
model is less dependent on the observed data set. 
To test the statistical significance in backward elimination procedure, I use significance level 
of 0.2 and utilize both Wald Chi-Square Test and Likelihood Ratio Test statistics. Both tests 
yield the identical results in terms of final model as well as the order in which the variables 
are deleted from the initial model. Table XI presents the steps in backward elimination and 
test statistics for the variables included, as well as the goodness of fit measures for the model 
as a whole. 
56 
 
 
 
Table XI 
Stepwise logistic regression of ESOs retaining time value in M&A 
Table presents the results of logistic regressions of ESOs losing time value in mergers and acquisitions on various target, 
acquirer, and transaction variables. P-values are reported in parentheses. Model specifications based on the stepwise 
backward elimination approach using criteria based on Wald test and p-value of 0.2. Model on the left most column 
includes all identified independent variables. Dependent variable Time Value Retained is a dummy that obtains value of one 
if options are categorized to retain time value in transaction and zero otherwise. Each column presents results for different 
model specification including the independent variables that have value in that column. Year dummy  is  equal  to  one  if  
transaction announced in 2009 and zero if in 2008; NYSE dummy is equal to one if  target  is  listed on NYSE, zero if  on 
Nasdaq; Stock dummy is equal to one if stock is used as method of payment; Cash dummy is equal to one if cash is used as 
method of payment; Tender Offer dummy is  equal  to  one  if  tender  offer  is  being  made;  Log Value is log of transaction 
value; Public Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer is public; US Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer nation is 
US; Remaining Life is weighted average of remaining life of target options outstanding; Completed dummy is equal to one 
if transaction is (partially) completed. Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions 
during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, 
stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, 
no target options, option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time 
value of options. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Independent Variable = Time Value Retained (dummy equal to one if options converted and time value retained) 
Intercept -4.67*** -4.69*** -5.13*** -5.28*** -5.23*** -5.27*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock 1.55*** 1.44*** 1.45*** 1.51*** 1.52*** 1.47*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash -1.04*** -0.99*** -0.96*** -1.01*** -1.01*** -1.12*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 
Log Value 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.80*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Public Acquirer 1.60*** 1.68*** 1.71*** 1.68*** 1.69*** 1.86*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
US Acquirer 1.30** 1.33** 1.44** 1.44** 1.44** 1.38** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) 
Tender Offer  -0.34 -0.48 -0.5 -0.49 -0.44 
  (0.415) (0.279) (0.255) (0.270) (0.328) 
Completed   0.40 0.40 0.37 0.34 
   (0.279) (0.270) (0.343) (0.393) 
NYSE    -0.29 -0.29 -0.51 
    (0.537) (0.531) (0.310) 
Year     -0.07 -0.10 
     (0.828) (0.761) 
Remaining Life      -0.03 
      (0.777) 
       
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 295 
Log likelihood -134.01 -133.67 -133.08 -132.89 -132.86 -126.66 
Likelihood-ratio Ȥ2 112.67*** 113.35*** 114.54*** 114.92*** 114.97*** 107.94*** 
McFadden's adj. R2 0.264 0.261 0.259 0.255 0.249 0.238 
BIC -84.055 -79.005 -74.471 -69.131 -63.455 -51.070 
AIC 0.915 0.919 0.922 0.927 0.934 0.933 
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In Table XI, the initial model with all the independent variables is presented in the right-most 
column and the resulting model defined using the backward elimination approach is model in 
the left-most column. For each variable in each alternative model specification, value for 
logistic regression coefficients and two-tail p-value for z-test are reported. In addition, for 
each model number of observations, log likelihood, likelihood-ratio chi-square test, 
McFadden’s adjusted R2, Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) are reported. 
Likelihood-ratio Ȥ2 is statistically significant in all specifications meaning that at least one of 
the independent variables is not equal to zero. AIC, BIC and McFadden’s adjusted R2 are all 
common goodness of fit measures used with logistic regressions that attempt to find a model 
that best fits the data with minimum number of free variables. Looking at the McFadden's 
adjusted R2 of different model specifications, one should notice that the value increases in 
each step of the model building process. Measure takes into account the likelihood of the 
model compared to likelihood of constant only model, and adjusts the value based on number 
of independent variables. Despite its name, one should note that in logistic regressions no R2 
measures similar to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression can be calculated, and hence the 
values are not comparable. AIC and BIC are often used in comparison of alternative model 
specifications, and here they also support the selection of model with least independent 
variables. With AIC and BIC, lower value is interpreted as better fit. 
Interestingly, five variables that are present in the resulting model after stepwise procedure, 
namely dummy variables Stock, Cash, Log Value, Public Acquirer, and US Acquirer, are 
statistically significant in all investigated combinations of the model. Public Acquirer, dummy 
for acquirer nation being US, is statistically significant at 0.05 level, while others are 
statistically  significant  at  either  0.01  or  0.001  level.  None  of  the  other  variables  show  any  
statistical significance in any of the model specifications. 
First variable to be eliminated from the initial model is Remaining Life that measures the 
weighted average remaining life of target company’s options outstanding. It was anticipated 
that if the remaining life of options is high, more time value would be lost and hence options 
would be converted in transaction to retain the time value. However, it might be that option 
moneyness that is tested in the following analyses has a larger effect than remaining life in 
explaining valuation method and implications to time value. Also, it is possible that a measure 
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of remaining life of options of CEO or board of directors only should be used, as these option 
holders are likely to have influence over the terms of the transaction. 
Second variable to be eliminated is Year dummy that is equal to one if transaction is 
announced in year 2009 and zero if in 2008. This control variable was included to capture any 
possible year effects, especially as the observation period is only two years. Based on the 
results we cannot conclude that the announcement year would have any effect on options 
retaining or losing time value. 
Third variable to be eliminated is NYSE dummy that is equal to one if company is listed on 
NYSE  and  zero  if  on  Nasdaq.  I  hypothesized  the  options  of  NYSE  companies  to  be  more  
frequently converted than Nasdaq companies, since in Nasdaq change-in-control provisions 
are more prevalent and usually force accelerated vesting of all options. Therefore acquirer 
may not have an incentive to convert options as large portion could be converted immediately. 
However, in this model specification NYSE dummy variable is highly insignificant and is 
eliminated from the model. Therefore the statistically significant association found in the 
univariate analysis is likely to results from NYSE dummy acting as a proxy for larger 
companies and higher transaction value, as the transaction value is present in the presenting 
regression model as well. 
Fourth variable to be eliminated a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction is 
completed or not. Not surprisingly this variable proves to be statistically insignificant and is 
eliminated from the model. 
Finally, dummy variable for making a tender offer is the sixth variable to be eliminated from 
the model. Making a tender offer is shown to be closely related with method payment as 
discussed in the previous section, as well as associated with option valuation method based on 
the univariate evidence. However, based on the regression model, dummy variable for tender 
offer is statistically insignificant while the variables for the method of payment are highly 
statistically significant. To verify the outcome, I run additional regressions with Tender Offer 
dummy included while omitting Stock, Cash, and finally both Stock and Cash dummy 
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variables. None of the specifications yield better goodness of fit of the model, and also none 
of the specifications result in Tender Offer turning to be statistically significant.26 
Statistical significance of variables can be affected by the order in which the variables are 
eliminated, and hence I further test the robustness of the model specification by adding each 
of the removed variables to the model one by one. Also, while adding NYSE variable to the 
model I test removing Log Value variable as these are highly positively correlated with each 
others. None of these procedures result to making any of the removed variables statistically 
significant at 0.05 level or increase the goodness of fit of the model measured with AIC or 
McFadden’s adjusted R2. Also, using stepwise forward procedure instead of backward 
elimination yields the exact final model.27 Results for the additional model specifications are 
shown in Appendix B. Finally, resulting model specification and statistical significances of 
variables remain intact if Huber-White robust standard errors are used or industry dummies 
based on NAICS classification are included.28 
5.2.3 Effect of option moneyness 
Final step in model the building is to test the effect of option moneyness by including a 
variable measuring the option moneyness to the model. As noted earlier, data set used in this 
study does not have information for option moneyness for all transactions and values are 
given only for in-the-money options. Therefore effect of moneyness is investigated separately, 
as the significant decrease in the sample size can disturb the analysis. 
As shown in Table IX, moneyness is calculated as the difference between offer value and 
average strike price, divided by the average strike price. If options are out-of-the-money and 
calculations yield a negative value, variable assumes values of zero. Inclusion of moneyness 
variable reduces number of observations in regression sample from 306 to 228. To alleviate 
                                               
26 Results not reported here, available on request. 
27 Stepwise  regression  using  forward  procedure  starts  with  the  constant  only  model  and adds  a  variable  to  the  
model that would have the highest p-value. Iterative procedure is continued until none of the variables to be 
added would have a p-value over a certain limit, here 0.20. 
28 Results not presented here, available on request. 
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the  possible  biases  emerging  from  the  use  of  different  samples,  the  results  for  the  
specifications with and without moneyness variable are estimated using the same sample for 
which the option moneyness information is available.   
Table XII 
ESO time value retention in M&A for subsample with data on option moneyness 
Table presents the results of logistic regressions of ESOs losing time value in mergers and acquisitions with and without 
Moneyness that measures the option moneyness as max[(offer value - strike price)/strike price, 0]. Dependent variable Time 
Value Retained is a dummy that obtains value of one if options are categorized to retain time value in transaction and zero 
otherwise. Each column presents results for different model specification including the independent variables that have 
value in that column. Stock dummy is equal to one if stock is used as method of payment; Cash dummy is equal to one if 
cash is used as method of payment; Log Value is log of transaction value; Public Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer 
is public; US Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer nation is US; Completed dummy is equal to one if transaction is 
(partially) completed. Sample consists of option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in 
which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) 
restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, 
option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 With Moneyness  Without Moneyness 
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
Intercept -5.491 1.247 0.000***  -5.420 1.239 0.000*** 
Stock 1.354 0.369 0.000***  1.342 0.367 0.000*** 
Cash -0.755 0.441 0.087*  -0.830 0.433 0.055* 
Log Value 0.465 0.220 0.035**  0.448 0.219 0.041** 
Public Acquirer 2.063 0.652 0.002***  2.029 0.651 0.002*** 
US Acquirer 2.155 0.809 0.008***  2.130 0.805 0.008*** 
Moneyness -0.094 0.095 0.324     
        
Observations  228    228 
Log likelihood  -101.720    -102.250 
Likelihood-ratio Ȥ2  86.81***    85.75*** 
McFadden's adjusted R2  0.251    0.254 
BIC  -54.235    -58.603 
AIC   0.954       0.950 
 
Regression results are presented in Table XII. Model without the moneyness is the exact 
specification that was deemed to be the best model based on stepwise regression presented in 
Table XI. Model with moneyness is the same model except that it includes moneyness 
variable. For both models the sample only consists of observations with option moneyness 
information available. 
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Starting with the goodness of fit measures, model with moneyness variables is slightly worse 
based on any measure that considers the number of free parameters. One should also note that 
goodness of fit of the model without the moneyness variables significantly deteriorates 
compared to the regression with full sample, as BIC value for instance increases from -84.1 to 
-58.6. Moneyness variable itself is far from any conventional statistical significance level with 
p-value of 0.324. Instead of using moneyness variable, I also test including a dummy variable 
that assumes value of one if options are out-of-the-money. This does not result to better fit of 
the model or improved information criteria scores, and also the dummy variable itself is 
insignificant. 
In sum, based on this investigation I find no support for including a variable for target option 
moneyness to the regression model as it does not increase the goodness of fit and the effect of 
the variable itself is statistically insignificant. 
5.2.4 Logistic regression results 
This section reports and interprets the results of the model defined with stepwise regression 
using backward elimination approach. As noted in the previous section, model specification is 
robust to inclusion of any of the removed variables and also to replacing any included variable 
with highly correlated eliminated variable. Equation for the resulting model is 
Time Value Retainedi = (4) 
 Įi + ȕ1 Stocki + ȕ2 Cashi + ȕ3 Valuei  
+ ȕ4 Public Acquireri + ȕ5 US Acquireri + İi 
 
Table XIII reports the regression results. When interpreting the results, one should keep in 
mind that retaining time value of options is equivalent to the valuation method of converting 
options  to  the  options  of  the  acquirer  or  the  surviving  corporation.  In  contrast,  losing  time  
value is equal to the method of only paying the intrinsic value to the option holders, meaning 
the offer value over the strike price of option. 
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Table XIII 
Determinants of ESOs retaining time value in M&A 
Table presents the results of logistic regressions of ESOs losing time value in mergers and acquisitions. Dependent variable 
Time Value Retained is a dummy that obtains value of one if options are categorized to retain time value in transaction and 
zero otherwise. Each column presents results for different model specification including the independent variables that have 
value in that column. Stock dummy is equal to one if stock is used as method of payment; Cash dummy is equal to one if 
cash is used as method of payment; Log Value is log of transaction value; Public Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer 
is public; US Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer nation is US; Completed dummy is equal to one if transaction is 
(partially) completed. Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 
2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, 
(debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, 
option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Odds Ratio 
Std. Err. of 
Odds Ratio 
 
95% Conf. Interval 
for Odds Ratio 
Intercept -4.67 0.000*** 
      Stock 1.55 0.000*** 
 
4.73 1.53 
 
2.51 8.90 
Cash -1.04 0.004*** 
 
0.35 0.13 
 
0.17 0.72 
Log Value 0.61 0.001*** 
 
1.84 0.34 
 
1.28 2.65 
Public Acquirer 1.60 0.002*** 
 
4.96 2.58 
 
1.79 13.76 
US Acquirer 1.30 0.024** 
 
3.66 2.11 
 
1.18 11.30 
         Observations 
 
306 
      Log likelihood -134.01 
      Likelihood-ratio Ȥ2 112.67*** 
      McFadden's adjusted R2 0.26 
      BIC -84.06 
      AIC 0.92 
 
    
 
    
 
Interpretation of coefficients in logistic model differs from interpretation in OLS regression. 
Coefficients indicate the amount of change expected in the log odds when there is a one unit 
change in the independent while keeping all of the other variables constant. Based on the 
coefficients, we can calculate a measure called odds ratio that is equal to the base of natural 
logarithm e to  the  exponent  equal  to  the  regression  coefficient.  Interpretation  of  odds  ratio  
(see for instance Gould, 2000) is that if the odds ratio is equal to 1.5, then the odds of the 
event are 50% greater when value of variable increases by one unit than without the increase. 
Correspondingly, if the odds ratio is equal to 0.5, then every unit increase halves the odds of 
the  event  compared  to  no  change  in  that  variable.  Finally,  if  odds  ratio  is  equal  to  one  we  
deem independent variable to have no effect on the value of dependent variable, as the natural 
logarithm of one is equal to zero. With dummy variables interpretation is identical. However, 
in a study like this we are more interested in the direction, magnitude, and statistical 
significance of coefficients than their exact values. 
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Effect of method of payment is captured with dummy variables for using stock and cash. 
Table XIII shows that using stock (value of stock dummy is equal to one) significantly 
increases the probability of options retaining the time value. Stock variable is statistically 
significant at  0.001 level.  Based on the estimated model,  value of the coefficient of stock is 
the second highest out of the variables in the model indicating a large contribution to the 
choice of option valuation method and retaining the time value. Using cash instead (value of 
cash dummy is equal to one) seems to significantly reduce the probability of retaining the 
time value. In other words, using intrinsic value method and therefore losing time value are 
associated with using cash in transactions. Cash is also statistically significant at 0.01 level. In 
addition, when both stock and cash are involved the probability of retaining time value 
increases as the sum of the coefficients is positive. In previous sections, the relation between 
making a tender offer and option valuation method were found to be statistically significant 
and also highly correlated with method of payment variables. However, the results of 
regression analysis support the view that the method of payment is the true determinant of the 
valuation method, and making a tender offer simply acts as a proxy for using cash. 
The results also show that when transaction value increases the options are more likely to be 
converted and retain the time value as anticipate. Log Value refers to logarithm of transaction 
value and the effect of variable is highly statistically significant with p-value of 0.001. 
Perhaps the most prominent explanation is that the highly valued and large companies are 
more likely to have significant amounts of options in use, and therefore paying the intrinsic 
value of options requires large amounts of cash. Also, paying intrinsic value and terminating 
the options could further warrant for the issuance of new incentive instruments even further 
increasing the cost to the acquiring company. 
Finally, acquirer characteristics related dummy variables for acquirer being public and from 
the US are found to be highly statistically significant with p-values of 0.002 and 0.024 
respectively. Quite obviously, publicly listed acquirers are significantly more likely to convert 
options and consequently retain the time value of options. This naturally follows from the fact 
that private companies are very unlikely convert options due to evident problems of defining 
option values for instance. However, more interestingly we can see that acquirer nation being 
US is also positively related to retaining the time value of options. Again, the direction of the 
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effect is as predicted, since I hypothesized the non-US companies who are to convert options 
of the target to face various difficulties related to legislation and accounting for instance. 
Table XIV 
ESO time value retention in M&A for method of payment subsamples 
Table presents the results of logistic regressions of ESOs losing time value in mergers and acquisitions on various target, 
acquirer, and transaction variables, for different subsamples based on the method of payment. Cash (Stock) subsample refers 
to observations in which method of payment includes cash (stock). Cash only and Stock only subsample essentially excludes 
the observations in which both cash and stock are used, or neither cash nor stock is used. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. Dependent variable Time Value Retained is  a  dummy that  obtains  value  of  one  if  options  are  categorized  to  
retain time value in transaction and zero otherwise. Each column presents results for different model specification including 
the independent variables that have value in that column. Stock dummy  is  equal  to  one  if  stock  is  used  as  method  of  
payment; Cash dummy is equal to one if cash is used as method of payment; Log Value is log of transaction value; Public 
Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer is public; US Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer nation is US. Sample 
consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is 
listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended 
transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, option valuation method not 
disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 Method of payment subsamples 
 All 
Cash only and 
Stock only Cash only Cash Stock 
Intercept -4.67*** -5.29*** -5.62*** -5.65*** -0.69 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.515) 
Stock 1.55*** 2.58***  1.27***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  
Cash -1.04***    -1.37*** 
 (0.004)    (0.005) 
Log Value 0.61*** 0.35 0.29 0.51** 0.60** 
 (0.001) (0.168) (0.348) (0.016) (0.015) 
Public Acquirer 1.60*** 1.85*** 1.90*** 1.86***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  
US Acquirer 1.30** 1.50** 1.97* 1.40** 0.69 
 (0.024) (0.037) (0.062) (0.039) (0.407) 
          
Observations 306 219 177 241 104 
Log likelihood -134.01 -82.00 -60.51 -101.64 -61.19 
Likelihood-ratio Ȥ2 112.67*** 87.12*** 19.47*** 62.71*** 13.02*** 
McFadden's adj. R2 0.264 0.307 0.082 0.191 0.008 
BIC -84.055 -65.563 -3.943 -40.771 0.915 
AIC 0.915 0.795 0.729 0.893 1.292 
 
To further investigate the effect of the method of payment I estimate the regression model for 
the  various  subsamples  based  on  the  method  of  payment.  In  Table  XIV,  the  subsample  
including the observations in which method of payment is only cash or only stock essentially 
excludes the observations paid with combination of cash and stock. Naturally in this model 
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specification, either of the method of payment dummy variables needs to be omitted due to 
perfect multicollinearity. Here I omit the cash variable, although the choice does not affect the 
interpretation of the results. Interestingly, variable for the transaction value turns out to be 
insignificant while the other variables remain highly statistically significant. Same applies to 
the results for the subsample of cash only deals. The findings imply that the transaction value 
has the largest effect in the cross-section where both cash and stock are used, and therefore 
when investigating the samples with mixed method of payment being excluded produces 
insignificant effect for the transaction value variable. The interpretation is further supported 
by the statistically significant effect of the transaction value in a subsample where method of 
payment includes cash, and also in a subsample where method of payment includes stock, 
since these subsamples also include the cases in which both stock and cash are used. 
Table XV 
Classification of ESOs retaining the time value based on the estimated model 
Table presents the classification measures for the sample based on the estimated model of log(p/1-p)= -4.67 + 1.55 * Stocki  
- 1.04 * Cashi + 0.61 * Log Valuei + 1.60 * Public Acquireri + 1.30 * US Acquireri + İi., where p refers to probability of 
options retaining the time value in transaction. Observation classified as true if the probability is greater or equal to 0.5. 
Dependent variable Time Value Retained is a dummy that obtains value of one if options are categorized to retain time 
value in transaction and zero otherwise. Stock dummy is equal to one if stock is used as method of payment; Cash dummy 
is equal to one if  cash is  used as method of payment;  Log Value is  log of transaction value;  Public Acquirer dummy is 
equal to one if acquirer is public; US Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer nation is US; Completed dummy is equal 
to one if transaction is (partially) completed. Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and 
acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, 
self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, 
bankrupt target, no target options, option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or 
retain the time value of options. 
Panel A: Classification table  Panel B: Classification measures  
 Actual  Sensitivity Pr(Ǔ=1|Y=1) 57.29 % 
Predicted Y=1 Y=0 Total  Specificity Pr(Ǔ=0|Y=0) 87.62 % 
Ǔ=1 55 26 81  Positive predictive value Pr(Y=1|Ǔ=1) 67.90 % 
Ǔ=0 41 184 225  Negative predictive value Pr(Y=0|Ǔ=0) 81.78 % 
Total 96 210 306  Correctly classified  78.10 % 
 
In addition to examining individual independent variables, predictive power of the model is 
studied. Table XV presents classification table and measures based on the actual and 
predicted values. One should keep in mind that the model estimation is based on only limited 
sample of observations, and also that testing a model with the same sample that was used in 
model estimation is likely to cause positive bias. 
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Using the estimated model to predict outcomes (Y equals to one if time value retained, equal 
to zero if time value lost) 78.10% of cases are correctly classified. The intrinsic value cases 
losing the time value are predicted correctly with significantly higher probability (around 
88%) than option conversion cases where the time value is retained (around 57%). However, 
when looking at the proportion of cases in which it is predicted that time value is retained, in 
68% of cases this actually is the case. 
In sum, somewhat surprisingly I am able to find strong support for certain other 
characteristics than the method of payment affecting whether options lose or retain time value 
in mergers and acquisitions. Method of payment is highly related as options are significantly 
more likely to retain time value if acquirer uses stock in transaction. When a combination of 
stock and cash is used it also increases the probability of options being converted although the 
effect is less significant compared to stock only transactions. Consequently use of cash is 
negatively related to retaining time value as options tend to be paid intrinsic value in cash 
deals. In addition, options are more likely to be converted and hence retain the time value in 
large transactions. Finally, publicly listed and US acquirers are more likely to convert options 
and not sacrifice the time value of options. 
6. Discussion of valuation implications 
This chapter discusses the implications of the findings in the previous chapters on ESO 
valuation. Despite the fact that certain target, acquirer, and transaction characteristics increase 
the probability of retaining the time value of options in mergers and acquisitions, it does not 
change the fact that in almost 70% of observations options are only paid the intrinsic value. 
First, I will discuss the use and determinants of option valuation methods found in this study, 
and compare the findings to the results in the previous literature. Second, I show how the 
findings of this study can affect the value of ESOs in different situations, and consider how 
the acquisition premiums can affect the outcome. Third, I discuss what could be the preferred 
valuation method by the different related parties, meaning the ESO holders and the owners of 
the target as well as the acquirer. 
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6.1 Use and determinants of valuation methods 
The results of this study clarify the previously ambiguous topic of how employee stock 
options are valued in mergers and acquisitions. Especially, it is shown that varying methods to 
value ESOs exists, and therefore it is not enough to simply consider the changes in the vesting 
status of option when merger or acquisition occurs as suggested by Maller et al. (2002). Also, 
the reduced form model of Szimayer (2004) does not seem to fit well with the empirical 
observations of this study as it omits the possibility of options being converted. In addition, 
the modeled fixed cash payments that depend on the vesting status do not echo the findings of 
this study. The assumption of ESOs simply vesting when a takeover takes place seems to be 
applied in some studies regarding the executive compensation in general, such as in Hartzell 
et al. (2004) who study the compensation of target CEO, and assume that all options of the 
CEO are paid the intrinsic value. Therefore, I believe the compensation literature in general 
will benefit from the increased understanding of ESOs in corporate transactions. 
I  find the results of the study to be somewhat different from Ferenczy (2008) who suggests 
the form of transaction, meaning whether a tender offer is made or not, to affect whether the 
options holders receive the intrinsic value or new options in the surviving corporation. 
Although conducting the tender offer as such seems to be related with the valuation method 
and increase the probability of option holders receiving the intrinsic value, I find evidence in 
support of tender offer only acting as a proxy for the method of payment. As previously 
discussed, these two are closely related as tender offers tend to be cash financed and mergers 
tend to be financed with stock. However, my results show that the method of payment better 
explains the method used. This is also supported by the ‘general rule’ outlined by the Court of 
Delaware. According to the opinion of the court, in cash deals ESOs can be paid the intrinsic 
value and as a consequence the out-of-the-money options can be forfeited with no 
consideration, whereas in stock deals option holders can expect to receive new options of the 
acquirer. However, as intrinsic value is not paid in all cash transactions and options are not 
converted  in  all  stock  deals,  I  also  show  that  other  variables  affect  the  choice  of  valuation  
method not discussed in the previous literature. 
However, this study only considers transactions with US listed target, and the results could 
vary between different countries. Only previous evidence comes from Finland, where Urtti 
(2009) studies the ESO valuation methods in Finnish transactions. In Finland ESOs can be 
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publicly listed after vested, and hence they become tradable securities instead of simple 
compensation contracts between the issuer and option holder. Urtti (2009) shows that in 
approximately half of the cases the intrinsic value is paid, but also cases in which value is 
determined using standard valuation model or market price of the traded options exist. Also, 
applying a minimum price for out-of-the-money options is far more common (approximately 
16% of mergers and acquisitions) than reported in this study (approximately 1%). Finally, in 
stark contrast with the results in this study, Urtti (2009) identifies no cases in which options 
would have been converted to the new options of the acquirer or the surviving corporation. 
I acknowledge that the results regarding the use of valuation methods can vary across the time 
because of the changes in the determining characteristics. Andrade et al. (2001) show that the 
method of payment can significantly fluctuate across the time. Authors demonstrate that 
during the merger wave in the late 1990s most of these deals were for stock, whereas during 
the ‘hostile’ takeover wave of the 1980s the method of payment was often cash. 
6.2 Implications to option valuation and the effect of acquisition premiums 
This section discusses the valuation implications of valuation methods used to price ESOs in 
mergers and acquisitions. I show that especially the takeover premiums that are paid over the 
pre-transaction share price make the analysis particularly complex. I first briefly discuss the 
valuation implications when options are converted, and then move on the intrinsic value 
method and its implications to the option value. 
Probability of being acquired and therefore the number of companies being affected by the 
treatment of options in mergers and acquisitions is surprisingly high. Andrade (2001) shows 
that during the 1980s and 1990s the average percentage of firms acquired fluctuates from 
roughly two to almost six percentages annually.29 In  terms  of  market  cap  the  annual  values  
range from around point five to three percentages. Therefore, during the normal maturity of 
ten years or even during the expected life of around five years getting acquired is in no means 
a rare event. 
                                               
29 Andrade (2000) includes companies found from the database of the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) to the analysis. 
69 
 
 
 
Implications of valuation methods are rather straightforward when no premium is paid for 
target stock.  If the intrinsic value is paid, the option value equals to stock price over the 
applicable exercise price as the stock price is equal to the offer value. Resulting value is never 
above the B-S value due to the lost time value. If options are converted, option value remains 
the same assuming the volatility does not change and other features of the options remain 
constant. 
However,  when  offer  value  includes  a  premium  over  the  pre-transaction  stock  price  of  the  
target, implications become less clear. Again, loosely speaking the value of converted options 
generally remains the same or increases as the number of options and the exercise price are 
adjusted using the exchange ratio that incorporates the offer value and value of acquirer stock. 
Therefore,  paying  the  premium increases  the  exchange  rate  and  results  to  higher  number  of  
new options with lower exercise prices compared to the situation where no premium is paid.30 
Because of the conversion of the options, the value of options is unlikely to be below the B-S 
value calculated before the transaction, unless the volatility of the new underlying stock is 
below the  volatility  of  target  stock.  Even  if  the  volatility  is  lower,  any  acquisition  premium 
paid compensates the effect. 
Going forward, when intrinsic value method is paid for options things get more complicated 
as it is even less clear whether the pre-transaction B-S value calculated using the stock price 
without the takeover premium is above the intrinsic value calculated with the premium. To 
better illustrate the effects, Figure IV shows comparisons between hypothetical pre-transaction 
B-S value and the intrinsic value paid in transaction that takes the acquisition premium into 
account. For the sake of simplicity, ordinary B-S model is used to calculate the pre-
transaction options values. When interpreting the results, one should keep in mind that the 
values produced by the ordinary B-S model are generally above the values produced by the 
                                               
30 If cash is used, the exchange ratio is calculated as the ratio between the offer value and acquirer stock price. If 
stock is used, then only the exchange ratio is usually announced, and consequently the offer value and the 
premium are calculated using the acquirer share price prior the deal announcement. The number of shares subject 
to options is multiplied with the exchange ratio to get the new number, whereas the new exercise price is 
calculated by dividing the exercise price with the exchange ratio. 
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numerous ESO valuation models. The magnitude, however, can vary significantly among the 
models and the assumptions used. 
In Figure IV the panels show the effect of change in one variable. Base case acquisitions 
premium (P) is equal to the median one-day premium in the sample (35%), and the value of 
option maturity (T)  is  equal  to  the  mean  remaining  life  in  the  sample  (5.8  years)  when  the  
intrinsic value is paid. Exercise price (X), stock price prior the transaction (S), volatility (V), 
and risk-free rate (R) are all arbitrarily chosen but have plausible values. Each of the graphs 
has two lines. One shows the option value calculated using the ordinary B-S formula using the 
stock price without the premium, and the other shows the intrinsic value of options taking the 
acquisition premium into account. Therefore, the pre-transaction B-S value and the intrinsic 
value with the acquisition premium are equal at the intersection of the lines. Interpreting the 
graphs allows drawing conclusions on whether the takeover premium causes the intrinsic 
value method to result to option values higher or lower than the value without the transaction. 
In addition, comparison of the exercise price and the stock price when the two values are 
equal offers some insight on how the option moneyness affects the outcome. Compared to the 
intersection of the two values, at any lower (higher) stock price the intrinsic value with 
premium remains below (above) the B-S value. 
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Panel A: Change in premium 
Normal Premium  Low premium 
 
 
 
Panel B: Change in time to maturity 
Low Maturity  High maturity 
 
 
 
Panel C: Change in volatility 
Low Volatility  High Volatility 
 
 
 Figure IV: Intrinsic value method, takeover premium, and implications to option valuation 
Figure presents option value as a function of pre-transaction stock price. B-S value (t=0) calculated using ordinary B-S formula 
(Black and Scholes, 1973) before the transaction. Intrinsic value (t=1) is the difference between Offer value and strike price (X) of 
option, where Offer value is calculated using the pre-transaction stock price and acquisition premium (P). T is option maturity in 
years, V is volatility, R is risk-free rate. 
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The top-left panel shows that under the prevailing assumptions, two lines cross approximately 
at the stock price equal to exercise price of the option. One should note that the intrinsic value 
is above zero already when the pre-transaction stock price is below the exercise price as a 
35% premium is paid. In the top-right panel a premium of 15% is paid and naturally the 
crossing point moves more to the right, meaning that options can be well in-the-money and 
still the intrinsic value is below the B-S value. Simple conclusion is that lower the premium, 
higher the probability of intrinsic value being lower than the B-S value. Again assuming that 
B-S value is approximately equal to the accounting fair value, one can conclude that if 
acquisition premium is low, losing time value due to the use of intrinsic value method is 
likely to cause decrease in the option value. 
Going forward, similar effects are illustrated with option maturity and stock return volatility.  
All other things equal, if the option maturity is very low intrinsic value is likely to exceed B-S 
value  even  when  the  options  are  slightly  out-of-the-money  prior  to  the  transaction.  
Correspondingly, with high maturity such as ten years, option need to be well in-the-money 
for intrinsic value to exceed B-S value. In the panels in the bottom, volatility proves to have 
the same effect as a low volatility also decreases the B-S value. Therefore, despite paying an 
acquisition premium, intrinsic value is unlikely to exceed B-S value for highly volatile 
companies. 
Finally, the combined effect of acquisition premium and the option moneyness is illustrated in 
Figure V. The absolute difference between the pre-transaction B-S value and the intrinsic 
value in transaction is shown in the vertical axis. Horizontal axes show the premium paid over 
the stock price and the option moneyness (moneyness of zero indicates option is at-the-
money). Other underlying assumptions are equal to the base case in Figure IV. When a 
relatively low premium is paid, approximately 15% or less, the intrinsic value of option does 
not exceed the B-S value even though the stock price would be two fold compared to the 
strike price of the option. In contrast, with premium of approximately 40% or higher, the 
intrinsic value with premium exceeds the pre-transaction B-S value already when the option is 
at-the-money based on the pre-transaction share price. 
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Figure V: Difference between pre-transaction B-S value and intrinsic value  
as a function of option moneyness and acquisition premium 
Figure presents the difference between the pre-transaction B-S value (following Black and Scholes, 1973) and the intrinsic 
value paid in transaction. Therefore, on vertical axis a positive (negative) value indicates the B-S value to be higher (lower) 
than intrinsic value. Black & Scholes value refers to option value calculated using ordinary Black & Scholes formula before 
the transaction. Intrinsic value refers to the difference between Offer value and strike price of option, where Offer value is 
calculated using the stock price and acquisition premium. Exercise price is expected to be 10; time to maturity 5.8 years; 
volatility 30%; risk-free rate 4%. Stock price ranges from zero to 20. Moneyness equals to (stock price - strike price)/strike 
price. 
 
In sum, this section shows using illustrative examples that premium paid for the target can 
have a significant effect on whether the intrinsic value method actually results in higher or 
lower option value compared to B-S value before the transaction. Option expenses are likely 
to exaggerate the true value of ESOs if target stock volatility and option maturity are high, 
options are not deep-in-the-money and if only a low premium is paid. In practice, the possible 
effects are best illustrated by looking at the group of cases in which the intrinsic value is paid 
and all the options are out-of-the-money even after taking the premium into account. In these 
extreme situations the payoff to all option holders is equal to zero because of losing the time 
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value  of  options.  These  cases  represent  a  significant  fraction  of  the  observations  in  the  
sample, summing up to 14%.31 
I acknowledge that models used to value ESOs usually produce values below the ordinary B-
S model applied here, but this would only move the intersection of the pre-transaction value 
and the intrinsic value, and therefore would not change the conclusions. More thorough 
analysis would require a formal model incorporating all the aspects. Given that the multiple 
ESO pricing models are based on the assumption of some exogenous stopping rate such as 
employee leaving the company, inclusion of the possibility of acquisition could be feasible. 
However, in addition to modeling the probability of the acquisition, complete model would 
somehow need to estimate the option valuation method and the premium over pre-transaction 
stock price as well. Even though the value to the option holder is not explicitly addressed 
here, to large extent the same conclusions apply. In addition, the option value to the holder is 
likely to increase because of the relaxed vesting conditions, but the magnitude will vary from 
holder to the holder. 
6.3 Implications and varying preferences over the valuation methods 
This section discusses the preferences of option valuation method of the acquirer, the target 
employees,  and  the  target  shareholders.  Although  not  empirically  tested,  I  anticipate  the  
preference for certain valuation method to be mainly affected by whether the acquirer is 
looking to retain the employees who have stock options, and the moneyness of the options. 
I  argue  that  the  acquirer  is  more  likely  to  convert  the  options  if  it  wants  to  retain  the  
employees who are holding the ESOs. In their study of accelerated vesting of employee stock 
options in anticipation of new accounting standards, Choudhary et al. (2008) note that the 
acceleration of unvested stock options removes the long-term incentive effects of option 
                                               
31 Univariate evidence on the option moneyness and the option valuation method is presented in Table VIII. 
Where information on option moneyness is available, the share of out-of-the-money observations is 14% when 
both intrinsic value and option conversion cases are considered, 21% when only the intrinsic value cases are 
considered, and finally 10% out of the intrinsic value and option conversion cases including also the 
observations where no information on option moneyness available. 
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contracts. Authors find that the average market reaction to the acceleration decision is about -
1%, and explain the negative perception by the financial markets to result from vesting of in-
the-money-options. This is argued to mean a wealth transfer from shareholders to the 
managers, but the authors seem to omit the fact that the vesting also decreases the cost to the 
firm as options are exercised early. Instead I would argue the reaction to also result from the 
fact that the owners know that new incentive instruments need to be issued to these ESO 
holders who are now able to immediately exercise their options. 
To avoid the cost of issuing new options or other types of incentive instruments, acquirer can 
decide to convert the options if permitted. However, as discussed earlier, the acquirer can be 
forced to accelerate the vesting of options if so stated in the option agreements hence making 
the conversion of options less attractive. Also, if the options are deep out-of-the-money, the 
incentive effect is likely to be insignificant. In these situations, the acquirer will consider the 
cost of issuing new incentive instruments in its valuation of the target resulting to a lower 
offer value. Therefore, the shareholders of the target can also prefer converting options if this 
actually reduces the ultimate cost to the acquirer and leads to higher valuation of the firm. 
In contrast, I anticipate the option holders to prefer receiving the intrinsic value, especially if 
they know that they will continue working for the company as they are very likely to receive 
new options or similar instruments in addition to cashing out their current options. In addition, 
Cai and Vijh (2006) document that acquisitions enable target CEOs to remove liquidity 
restrictions on stock and option holdings, and that CEOs with higher holdings are more likely 
to make acquisitions and accept a significantly lower acquisition premium.   When the options 
are out-of-the-money, the intrinsic value is equal to zero and the option holders receive 
nothing in lieu of terminating the options. It naturally follows that the majority of option 
holders rather see their options being converted to retain even the time value of the options, 
unless they anticipate receiving additional compensation following the termination of their 
out-of-the-money options. However, the analysis is distorted by the fact that the target 
managers can receive other types of additional compensation when the transaction takes place 
therefore diluting the significance of the stock options. Hartzell et al. (2004) show that 12% of 
CEOs have their golden parachutes increased and that 28% receive variety of additional cash 
bonuses. These CEOs are also more likely to lose their jobs, implying that acquirers overtly 
pay certain CEOs to surrender managerial control over their firm. 
76 
 
 
 
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that competing preferences and incentives related to 
the treatment of options in transactions exists among different parties. Acquirer needs to 
balance between its incentives of managing the ESO related costs and satisfying the target 
executives to make the deal go through. Target shareholders are likely to be in the support of 
the method preferred by the acquirer to maximize the value they would receive from selling 
the company, unless they are option holders by themselves as well. However, most of the time 
these characteristics are likely to be play significant role only in the cross-section where the 
option valuation is not definitively stipulated in the option agreements. In addition, as 
discussed earlier in the case of lawsuit against AT&T, the acquirer and the target need to 
consider the threat of legal actions as well. 
7. Conclusion 
Previous studies identify numerous features of ESOs that prevent their valuation using 
standard option valuation models. In this study, I show that the possibility of company being 
acquired should be incorporated to the ESO valuation models since the valuation methods 
used in the transactions can produce option values significantly different from the theoretical 
value of options prior the transactions. I classify valuation methods based on whether the time 
value of options is lost or retained, and study what determines the outcome. I find that in 67% 
of the cases option holders only receive the intrinsic value of the options and hence the time 
value is sacrificed. On average, offering only the intrinsic value of options sacrifices 5.7 years 
of remaining option life, highlighting the fact of ESOs being long maturity options and the 
time value  being  a  significant  component  of  the  option  value.  I  further  show that  when the  
acquisition premium is taken into account, paying the intrinsic value can cause either upward 
or downward bias to the option values. The cases in which all options are out-of-the-money 
and the intrinsic value is paid are prime examples of situations where omitting the possibility 
of transaction causes upward bias to the option values. In these situations, the value of options 
is essentially destroyed since the options are forfeited and the payoff to the option holders is 
equal to zero.  
In addition to paying the intrinsic value, other prevailing option valuation method is to 
convert options to the options of the acquirer or the surviving corporation, and therefore retain 
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also the time value of the options. This method is applied in 30% of the cases. From the 
valuation point of view, converting options generally retains or increases the option value. 
I find strong support for certain target, acquirer, and transaction characteristics affecting 
whether options lose or retain the time value that are not identified in the previous literature. 
As  suggested  by  the  Court  of  Delaware,  options  are  significantly  more  likely  to  retain  time 
value if acquirer uses stock in a transaction. Consequently, the use of cash is negatively 
related to retaining the time value as options tend to be paid intrinsic value in cash deals. In 
addition, options are more likely to be converted and hence retain the time value when 
transaction becomes larger in terms of the transaction value, and the effect is strongest in the 
cross-section where the combination of stock and cash is used. Also, publicly listed and US 
acquirers are more likely to convert options and not sacrifice the time value of options. 
However, conducting a tender offer does not seem to affect the outcome as suggested by 
Ferenczy (2008), but it rather acts as a proxy for the method of payment. 
Maller et  al.  (2002) and Szimayer (2004) discuss the effect  of corporate transactions on the 
valuation of ESOs, but they fail to address the possibility of options being converted instead 
of simply terminating and cashing out the options. In contrast to the previous studies, my 
findings also show that the vesting status prior to the transaction has little effect on what 
happens to options in transaction, since in most of the cases the vesting of all options is 
accelerated. Maller et al. (2002) and Szimayer (2004) also both note that the value of ESOs 
tend to increase when a merger or acquisition takes place, but I show that depending on the 
valuation method both higher and lower option values exists. In addition, when assessing the 
ultimate cost of the options in transactions, it is important to note that the acquirer is likely to 
face additional costs if options are terminated and paid the intrinsic value, since new incentive 
instruments are likely to be issued. 
Main  contribution  of  the  study  is  that  it  highlights  the  importance  of  the  possibility  of  
company being bought to the valuation of ESOs, and the investigation of the valuation 
method determinants lays out the foundation for the development of pricing models that 
predict how options are valued in these situations. Incorporating the findings of the study to 
the pricing models would produce more accurate estimates of ESO expenses to the 
companies, as well as more precise estimates of ESO values to the option holders. This may, 
however, require companies to adopt some more flexible valuation model than B-S. Simply 
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adjusting the expected life variable of the B-S model is insufficient, since the payoff profile 
when the transaction takes place deviates from the early exercise event. Furthermore, 
compensation literature and studies on corporate transactions in general are likely to benefit 
from the findings of the study. For instance, when investigating the incentives of executives in 
making transactions, Cai and Vijh (2006) show that the magnitude of CEO liquidity 
restrictions due to the stock and option holdings is associated with the probability of getting 
acquired and the level of acquisition premium accepted. 
The topic could be expanded in several ways to further investigate the valuation of ESOs in 
corporate transactions. As discussed, current ESO pricing models could be developed to take 
the threat of being acquired and the valuation method into account. This would allow for more 
in depth analysis of valuation effects than presented in the context of this study. Also, 
estimating the option values for individual transactions before and after the transaction would 
provide better understanding the valuation effects. Other types of transactions could also be 
investigated, such as demergers and spin-offs, although they constitute a relatively small 
fraction of transactions compared to mergers and acquisitions. Replicating the study in 
another country could also prove to be interesting, although the disclosure environment is 
likely to set some limitations especially in countries with less developed reporting standards. 
Finally, simply considering additional explanatory variables could offer additional insight or 
simply further verify the results found in this study. However, these undoubtedly interesting 
issues are left for the future research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: M&A activity by number of transactions and transaction value 
 
 
Figure VI: M&A activity by number of transactions and transaction value 
Figure depicts the merger activity of the sample. The sample includes 381 transactions and consists of mergers and 
acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self 
tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt 
target, no target options. Number of transactions and aggregate deal value based on the announcement dates and the 
transaction values from SDC Platinum database.  
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Appendix B: Alternative logistic regression specifications 
Table XVI 
Model specification of ESOs retaining time value in M&A using forward procedure 
Table presents the results of logistic regressions of ESOs losing time value in mergers and acquisitions on various target, 
acquirer, and transaction variables. P-values are reported in parentheses. Model specifications based on the stepwise forward 
procedure approach using criteria based on Wald test and p-value of 0.2. Dependent variable Time Value Retained is  a  
dummy that obtains value of one if options are categorized to retain time value in transaction and zero otherwise. Each 
column presents results for different model specification including the independent variables that have value in that column. 
Stock dummy is equal to one if stock is used as method of payment; Cash dummy is equal to one if cash is used as method 
of payment; Log Value is log of transaction value; Public Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer is public; US Acquirer 
dummy is equal to one if acquirer nation is US. Sample consists of 306 option valuation observations in mergers and 
acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, 
self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions with undisclosed dollar value, 
bankrupt target, no target options, option valuation method not disclosed, and observations not classified to either lose or 
retain the time value of options. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Independent Variable = Time Value Retained (dummy equal to one if options converted and time value retained) 
Intercept -4.67*** -3.27*** -3.97*** -2.98*** -1.77*** -0.78*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock 1.55*** 1.62*** 1.81*** 1.78*** 2.32***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Public Acquirer 1.6*** 1.49*** 1.63*** 1.78***   
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000)   
Log Value 0.61*** 0.54*** 0.43**    
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.012)    
Cash -1.04*** -1.04***     
 (0.004)      
US Acquirer 1.3**      
 (0.024)      
       
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Log likelihood -134.01 -136.94 -141.20 -144.49 -152.52 -190.35 
Likelihood-ratio Ȥ2 112.67*** 106.82*** 98.28*** 91.71*** 75.66***  
McFadden's adj. R2 0.264 0.254 0.237 0.225 0.188  
BIC -84.055 -83.921 -81.114 -80.263 -69.933  
AIC 0.915 0.928 0.949 0.964 1.010   
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Table XVII 
Alternative model specifications for ESO time value retention in M&A 
Table presents the results of logistic regressions of ESOs losing time value in mergers and acquisitions on various target, 
acquirer, and transaction variables. P-values are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable Time Value Retained is  a  
dummy that obtains value of one if options are categorized to retain time value in transaction and zero otherwise. Each 
column presents results for different model specification including the independent variables that have value in that column. 
Year dummy is equal to one if transaction announced in 2009 and zero if in 2008; NYSE dummy is equal to one if target is 
listed on NYSE, zero if on Nasdaq; Stock dummy is equal to one if stock is used as method of payment; Cash dummy is 
equal to one if cash is used as method of payment; Tender Offer dummy is equal to one if tender offer is being made; Log 
Value is log of transaction value; Public Acquirer dummy is equal to one if acquirer is public; US Acquirer dummy is equal 
to  one  if  acquirer  nation  is  US;  Remaining Life is weighted average of remaining life of target options outstanding; 
Completed dummy is equal to one if transaction is (partially) completed. Sample consists of 306 option valuation 
observations in mergers and acquisitions during 2008 and 2009 in which target company is listed on either Nasdaq or 
NYSE. Excluded are repurchases, self tenders, stake purchases, (debt) restructurings, intended transactions, and transactions 
with undisclosed dollar value, bankrupt target, no target options, option valuation method not disclosed, and observations 
not classified to either lose or retain the time value of options. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and *** at the 1% level. 
Independent Variable = Time Value Retained (dummy equal to one if options converted and time value retained) 
Intercept -4.67*** -4.69*** -4.98*** -4.78*** -4.63*** -4.72*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock 1.55*** 1.44*** 1.60*** 1.60*** 1.58*** 1.46*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash -1.04*** -0.99*** -1.04*** -1.08*** -1.04*** -1.09*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Log Value 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.69*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Public Acquirer 1.60*** 1.68*** 1.59*** 1.58*** 1.61*** 1.79*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
US Acquirer 1.30** 1.33** 1.36** 1.30** 1.32** 1.25** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030) 
Tender Offer  -0.34     
  (0.415)     
Completed   0.29    
   (0.416)    
NYSE    -0.23   
    (0.615)   
Year     -0.18  
     (0.558)  
Remaining Life      -0.01 
      (0.906) 
       
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 295 
Log likelihood -134.01 -133.67 -133.68 -133.88 -133.84 -127.95 
Likelihood-ratio Ȥ2 112.67*** 113.35*** 113.34*** 112.93*** 113.02*** 105.36*** 
McFadden's adj. R2 0.264 0.261 0.261 0.260 0.260 0.253 
BIC -84.055 -79.005 -79.001 -78.586 -78.676 -71.235 
AIC 0.915 0.919 0.919 0.921 0.921 0.915 
 
